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OF
H A P P I N E S S.

BY RICHARD KIRWAN, ESQ. L. L. D. P. R. I. A. E. R. S. &c.

CHAP. I.

Definitions and general Observations.

READ NOVEMBER, 13th, 1809

1. **HAPPINESS**, strictly understood, denotes that state in which pleasure is unceasingly perceived unmixed with pain, as Misery is that state in which pain is durably suffered unmixed with pleasure.

It is distinguished from pleasure only by the utter exclusion of pain, with which mere *pleasure* is frequently accompanied, preceded, or followed. *Pleasure* is applicable only to perceptions, but happiness is attributable only to states, or to such individuals on whom those perceptions are impressed uninterrupted by pain.

2. Happiness is susceptible of various degrees, according to the *number, intensity, duration* and *complexity* of the plea-

asures that constitute it; however the *number* of co-existing pleasures contributes to happiness only when they are moderate. A *single* pleasure, if intense, prevents attention to every other; thus the overwhelming pleasures arising from the sublimity or pathos, of poetry, oratory or music, render us, while in their vigour, insensible to the exquisite versification of the poet, the elaborate elegance of the orator, and to the fascinating melody of the composer.—But (3.) when the strength of these emotions is somewhat abated, then the pleasures they produce, and those arising from the structure of their exciting causes, are simultaneously perceived.

4. *Intense* pleasures are those that engross the entire attention, and thus render us insensible to every other perception of inferior intensity.

5. *Moderate*, are those that attract it more feebly or partially. Most are susceptible of various degrees; the inferior degrees are called *amusements*; but even the most trifling, if unattended with pain, either corporeal or mental, as in children, contribute to an inferior degree of happiness.

6. The inability to fix attention in any degree in our waking hours, occasions a high degree of misery, known by the name of irksomeness or *ennui*.

7a. Pleasures, whether intense or moderate, are more or less *durable*; the *intense*, except in a few instances*, are the least; the *moderate* the most so; the former are generally followed

* These are study, meditation, and composition.

followed by fatigue or pain, the latter are exempt from both : the most durable gradually languish and fade away, and in proportion to this decay the attention bestowed upon them declines and subsides : all are diminished by repetition.

7*b*. The nature of simple and complex pleasures or pains cannot here be explained, but shall in the sequel. Human life, it must be owned, has in no instance, ever exhibited an unbroken series of such happiness as has been here defined ; many of the perceptions experienced during its continuance are purely painful, and by these, feelings even of the pleasurable kind are too frequently infested, sullied, debased and degraded, a truth of which we are fatally convinced both from experience and from observation.

8. Hence the only happiness of whose attainment we can entertain any rational hope, or discover any instance in the present state of our existence, is of the *mixed kind*, made up indeed of pain and pleasure, but in such proportion, as that upon the whole, on balancing the account, pleasure may be found to predominate either in the comparative number of its perceptions, or in their intensity, or in duration ;* but if, on settling the account, painful perceptions be found to exceed in those respects, then a life so conditioned must upon
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* In strictness, that condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleasures exceeds that of pain ;—the degree of happiness depends on this excess. Paley's Moral Philos. c. 6. so also Maupertuis and 2 Search. 183.

the whole be deemed to be, or to have been, a scene not of happiness but of *misery*.

9. That on questions naturally arising from the consideration of a subject so complex, intricate and extensive, different opinions should be entertained, may well be expected. Many think that on a general survey of our present existence, *misery* will be found to be the ultimate result of our observations. Some have endeavoured to prove that more happiness is found in the savage than in the civilized state; and others assert it can be found only in the civilized state, and is equally distributed betwixt its different classes, though unequally among the individuals that compose each class; and finally, others think it unequally distributed among these different classes, some asserting its prevalency in the superior, others in the inferior, but granting its inequality among different individuals of each class.

10. To examine the truth or falsehood of these opinions, with such a degree of accuracy as the subject permits, it is necessary that we should enumerate the general sources, both of those pleasures and pains that occur, or may occur, in every state and condition of human life; and then endeavour to trace and estimate the quantity of each in the above-mentioned states and conditions.

11. We must further remark, that all our pleasures and pains are derived to us either *immediately* through the medium of our senses, and hence called *corporeal*, or *mediately* through
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the imagination, and thence called *ideal*, or totally foreign to, and unconnected with the senses, and thence called *mental*.

12. Farther, the capacity of receiving mental pleasure or pain, differs from those capacities or powers usually attributed to the human mind, namely, *memory*, *understanding* and *will*; for the exercise of none of these is essentially connected with pleasure, nor with pain, though frequently accompanied with either; they proceed in every case from the senses, or the imagination, or from a faculty hitherto unnoticed, which I call *affectibility*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Corporeal Pleasures and Pains.

13. **CORPOREAL** pleasures and pains are, not only those which we receive from the senses as just mentioned, but those that affect the whole frame, as *exercise* and *lassitude*, *rest* after fatigue, *incipient* sleep, *refreshment* after long abstinence, *renewed vigour* after sound sleep, *languor* and *sickness*.

14. Of the senses five are commonly reckoned and are well known; but to the pleasures they impart we may add that of the *stomach* on receiving food of which it had long suffered the privation, and of the *fauces* when relieved from thirst—these may be called *internal* senses.

15. All sensual pleasures were probably at first *organic*, that is apparently seated in the organs through whose mediation they are received, though at present only those of *taste*, *smell* and *touch*, and their antagonist pains, are deemed to reside in their respective organs.—But the impressions of vision and of hearing, at present bear no reference to their respective organs, unless excessive or the organs diseased. I say that *at present*, only those of *taste*, *smell* and *touch* and those arising from the gratification of the *internal senses* are organic, for the pleasure of vision, was certainly at first organic,
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since the youth whom Chiselden's operation enabled to see, declared he felt a most delicious sensation in his eye ; but this pleasure faded away, never more to be recovered ; its absence however was amply compensated by the emotion of Joy at the acquisition of a new sense.

17. Mankind in general love pleasure, particularly the organic, more than they fear pain, even when pain precedes the pleasure, but more especially when pleasure precedes, and the consequent pain is in any degree doubtful. Nay, the gratification of the passions of love and revenge and the desire of fame frequently overcome the fear of certain pain, whether preceding or following.

18^a. Past pleasures, if moderate, are soon forgotten, if intense, their recollection is attended with melancholy or regret, or even with sorrow, grief or remorse, but the recollection of past *pains* or dangers, on the contrary, is pleasing, by contrast with our actual state of freedom from them. As they are generally more intense than pleasures are, they are longer remembered.

18^b. The intensity of *corporeal* pleasures diminishes in proportion to their duration, but the intensity of corporeal pain increases with its duration. On the contrary, the intensity of *mental* pleasure increases with its duration, and that of mental pain diminishes.

§ 1.

Of the pleasures of vision and their correlative pains.

19. **THE** only visual perceptions essentially pleasureable are those of *light* and *colours*; for they can no more be separated from pleasure than the sweetness of honey from the pleasure it affords. And 1st, *light*, because it sets all the internal organs of vision in motion, and from the moderate motion of these, visual pleasure seems to arise, though it no longer appears seated in the eye itself as it did at first. This motion may be observed in the pupil of the eye, which expands or contracts according as the light is more or less abundant, and excessive light, if long continued, is known to destroy internal organization; hence Milton's expression, *dark with excessive light*. 2dly, pure *colours*, such as those of the prismatic rays, are distinct modes of visual pleasure inseparably inherent in, or rather perfectly identified with them—a pleasure that also seems derived from peculiar gentle motions of the organ; hence scarlet and deep violet are the least pleasing, the former by the violence of its action, and the latter by its debility. Impure colours are less pleasing as including a mixture of opacity, or even displeasing when their mixture produces organic motions that obstruct each other.

other. Purple is pleasing by tempering the intensity of the red, and enlivening the languor of the deep violet.

20. *Variety* is pleasing by supporting attention, which is apt to droop when a single object is long contemplated; hence the pleasure of shews.

Visible objects appear either in motion or at rest; the results of their motion form events.

21. *Proportion*, which is the ratio of similitude discerned betwixt different visible objects, is indeed introduced by vision of the objects which present it, but is not itself a visual, but rather an intellectual object.*

22. *Beauty*, in its *strict literal sense*, is a denomination solely applicable to objects that afford pleasure to the sight, independantly of any relation to any thing else—such objects are light and colours. In the most ancient and venerable book now existing, we find this term first applied to the fruit of the fatal tree, its colour being said to be beautiful. But *in a somewhat more enlarged sense* it is applicable to such forms as most powerfully suggest instinctive sympathetic affections, emotions and sentiments. Such forms constitute *sexual beauty*, which therefore consists in such expression in the frame of each sex as has the strongest tendency to inspire those feel-

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* What was the original colour of man, whether *black* or *white*, has been attempted to be rendered doubtful; but that it was the *white* seems to me to be satisfactorily inferred from this, that warm climates, even at this day, produce in the *whites* an approximation to blackness, but no change of climate produces in the *blacks* an approximation to whiteness.

ings in the other. But as these impressions are various, both in kind and degree, in the sex on whom they are made, hence the common saying, that *every eye makes a beauty*.

24. In a *still more enlarged sense* all visible forms that excite *admiration* are termed *beautiful*. This admiration may arise from various sources, too numerous to be here enumerated.* Many, which originally were beheld with pleasing wonder, as watches, &c. now cease to excite any, from our having been long accustomed to them.

25. In a *metaphorical or figurative sense*, many objects not visible are often called *beautiful*; thus we talk of beautiful music, songs, sonatas, and even of beautiful single sounds; beautiful inventions, the beauty of virtue, beautiful allegories, &c. nay even of beautiful theorems in mathematics; as they all, by exciting admiration or approbation, produce pleasure analagous to those of vision.

26. *Grace* denotes the beauty found in motions, gestures or postures; it consists in an expression of refinement, respect, or of any of the milder passions, unlike the hasty, awkward, impetuous motions and unbecoming postures of savages, or of the lower unpolished class of civilized society.

27. The sense of the *sublime* is also a pleasure awakened in us by vision, being excited by objects whose magnitude suggests the existence of a power far exceeding the human: thus lofty mountains, the apparently unbounded expanse of
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* See 1 Blair's Lectures, p. 104.

the ocean, the immense vault of the heavens bespangled with stars, or any other extent in every sense unlimited, when attended to never fail to excite it, and are therefore themselves denominated sublime; it seems to me to consist in an emotion of *astonishment* at the power exerted in the production of such objects.

28. Hence the production of any other effects, suggesting the notion of infinite power, by causing astonishment, may be denominated sublime.* Terrific objects, so far from contributing to this emotion, seem to me rather to interrupt and suppress it, by exciting another emotion that interests us more nearly.

29. *Grandeur* is an approximation to the sublime, exciting an inferior but analagous emotion; this we experience in beholding the elevation of a balloon, or the magnificent spectacle of a first rate ship of war.

30. Here it may not be amiss to remark, that *magnanimity*, by exciting some degree of surprise, has frequently been confounded with the sublime, and dignified with that appellation: it seems however to be applicable only to sentiments which excite *admiration*, by indicating a frame of mind superior in energy, vigour or fortitude, to that observed in *common mortals*; thus the *illum non populi fasces, non purpura regum—flexit*, &c. of Virgil; the apostrophe of Demosthenes
justifying

* Hence Huet was much mistaken in denying the sublimity of Genes. 1. 3. he falsely imagined that simplicity was opposite to the sublime. See x Bib. Choisie, 229.

justifying the unsuccessful battle of Cheronea, the *qu'il mourut* of Corneille are indeed striking instances of magnanimity, but cannot be denominated sublime.

31^a. The *pains* derived from vision, when not of the sympathetic kind, are but few : namely, that arising from a view of *deformed* objects (and this may easily be avoided) and the *horror* felt on a near approach to precipices ;—and even this ceases in persons long accustomed to such views.

31^b. The pleasures of the *imagination* are for the most part derived from a mental representation of beauteous objects, attended with pleasing associations ; more rarely from representations of the sublime, frequently from delusive visions of future happiness, or of prosperous events, often from the contemplation of scenes suggested by real or fabulous histories. Its countervailing pains are numerous, and much more intense since they lead to insanity, and often to the most direful superstition.

§ 2.

Of the Pleasures and Pains conveyed by the sense of Hearing.

32. THE objects of this sense are sounds, and these when *pure, properly combined, and varied*, afford the highest pleasure we receive through any of the senses; it probably at first appeared seated in the internal organs of the ear, though at present these organs are perceptibly affected only by harsh, over acute, hoarse, ill combined or confused sounds; these last constitute *noise*; the *agreeable* seem transmuted into the sentiments they inspire.

33. Single sounds, when perfectly pure, such as those elicited from glass cups, properly constructed and touched, infuse pleasures that seem to us to participate of the celestial; so also do combined sounds perfectly concordant.

34. The pleasure produced by pure single sounds, seems to arise from the free, gentle, uninterrupted motion of the internal auditory organs; for when excessively *loud*, excessively *low*, as in whispers; or *acute*, as those of some birds; or *grave* and *deep*, as the bellowing of oxen, thunder, &c. or *stridulous*, as that of oaten pipes and often of hautbois; or *interrupted*, as that of a hoarse human voice; or *shrill*, as that of trumpets; or confused and monotonous, as that of drums,

drums, are displeasing ; as the over loud overpower the auditory organs, the over low act upon them too feebly, the over acute strain them,* and the over grave or deep difficultly excite corresponding motions: yet the sound of trumpets, when properly varied, and that of drums, when exactly measured, are very agreeable.

35. Two or more sounds that produce agitations in the auditory nerves, that do not interrupt each other, but so strictly coalesce as to produce a 3d sound, whether heard jointly or in succession, are highly agreeable ; such are consonants and concords, but those that disturb and interrupt the action of each other on the auditory organs, are called dissonants and discords ; some of these however, when properly managed, produce a pleasing effect, and perhaps all, when introduced on proper occasions.

36. Some men have their organs of hearing so unfortunately constructed, as to receive no impression corresponding with the 3d sound, and consequently no perception of harmony ; these are commonly said to have no ear for music : most of them however, I believe, receive pleasure from the variety and measure of successive sounds, particularly when they excite alacrity.

37. Petrarch relates, he met with a man who was more pleased with the croaking of frogs, than with the dulcet strains of the nightingale.

38. Music

* These Dr. Burney calls *cork-cutting notes*. Hist. Mus. vol. 4. p. 481.

38. Music consists in the agreeable succession whether of single or simultaneous sounds ; the former is called *melody*, the latter *harmony* : it differs from beauty in this that it not only produces pleasing sensations, but excites various sentiments, and occasionally even passions : whereas beauty, except that of the sexes, is incapable of exciting any emotion, but that of admiration. Colours, neither by their succession nor by their simultaneity, produce any distinct pleasure arising therefrom.

39. Music, in as much as it affords *sensational pleasure*, for want of any other appropriate term, is called *beautiful*, as like beautiful objects, it excites admiration : but this analogy is very distant and imperfect ; as those musical passages denominated *beautiful* not only produce admiration, but impress sensations infinitely more intense and forcible, than any that beauty (except the sexual) can inspire.

40. But the principal, and indeed incomprehensible merit of music, consists in its action on the imagination and mental affections, with which no succession of sounds has any conventional nor other conceivable connexion ; in this respect its power seems to partake of the *supernatural*, like that anciently attributed to magic ; and hence the epithet *enchanting* is properly applied to it : in fact the ancients supposed that by music the Moon may be brought down from her sphere, *lunam deducere cantu*, and rocks and wild beasts attracted, *saxa ferasque lyra movit Rhodopeius Orpheus*, and the most fu-

rious passions excited or assuaged. This power is called that of *expression*; when it is in no degree exerted, the strains produced cannot properly be called music, but rather a jumble of sounds.

41. The *magnanimous* emotions and sentiments must, to be supremely pleasing, be expressed with *dignity*,* the *sublime* with majesty, the gentle and milder with dignity, grace† and elegance,‡ even when worked up to frenzy. The degree with which this power is exerted, constitutes the superior excellence of the composition, and proves the superior genius of the composer.

42. As many passions, emotions and sentiments are nearly allied with each other; for instance, the *majestic* with the *martial*;§ the *tender* with the *plaintive*;¶ the mind would be apt to confound and mistake the strains expressive of the one for those of the other, unless it were guided to the discrimination of each, by words declaring their specific application, and the circumstances that give birth and growth to each sentiment; hence the propriety of the union of poetry and music. Melodies thus introduced are capable of inspiring

* By *dignity* I understand a mode of expression becoming persons of rank and education, or beings of a superior nature, and opposite to *vulgar*, *mean* and *groveling*.

† By *grace* I understand a smooth, gentle, melodious, soothing arrangement of sounds, and opposite to the *uncouth*, *harsh* and *whining*.

‡ *Elegance* denotes selection, in opposition to trite, common place passages. See *il Caro ben perdei*.

§ As *son Regina & son Amante*, and *non ti timo in campo Armato*.

¶ *Cara saro fedele*, &c. and *si tutti i Mali miei*, &c.

ing pleasures that penetrate into the inmost recesses of the soul; but such transcendant pleasures are experienced only in operas and oratorios composed by the best masters, duly attended to, and properly executed.

43. *Solos*, *sonatas* and even *concertos* being destitute of such accompaniment, must, to compensate in some measure for this defect, suggest imaginary scenes productive of emotions or sentiments, and please by well managed contrasts and passages original and striking. Sudden whimsical transitions, destructive of any imaginable scenery, may indeed surprise, as rope-dancers do, but must disgust persons of real taste.

44. *Overtures*, as I was informed by that eminent master, *Sacchini*, must afford some fore-taste of the sentiments contained in the pieces they introduce: This I mention because Rousseau was of a contrary opinion: * of such overtures that great man has given excellent specimens in those to *Rinaldo*, *Chimene*, and many others.

45. The sentiments expressed by music are chiefly the following:—The *religious*, the *majestic*, the *pompous*, the *haughty*, the *indignant*, the *spirited*, the *martial*, the *terrific*; the *exhilarating*, the *lively*, the *jovial*, the *comic*; the *melancholy*, † the *tender*, the *plaintive*, the *supplicating* (Burney, 494,) the *anxious*, the *horrific*, the *romantic*, ‡ the *imitative*. §

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* Dict. Musique *overture*.

† Brown, page 44 of his *Letters on Music*, remarks that the melancholy must not approach to deep distress, for then it becomes mean lamentation.

‡ As in the *Bergeries de Couperin*.

§ As *se perde Pussignol*.

It were easy to adduce examples of each of these, if this were the proper place.

46. The sublime is also a sentiment which music can excite in a much higher degree than any visible object: it is produced by an elaborate and magnificent combination of sounds distributed into 6, 8, or at least 4 parts, celebrating the infinite majesty of the Supreme Being: the most perfect specimen of this is exhibited by Handel;—*He is the King of Glory, the Lord God reigneth for ever and ever, hallelujah.*—The most exquisite performance ever produced by man. See the grand chorus of the Messiah.

47. The pleasures of vision and music not being perceptibly organic, are deemed to participate more of a spiritual nature than any other proceeding from the senses, and hence are the only that are mentioned to exist in heaven.

48. The pains impressed through the sense of hearing, besides those mentioned, No. 32 and 34, are chiefly of the sympathetic kind, as those caused by groans, lamentations, mournful ditties void of grace or dignity; though even these, by powerfully agitating sluggish minds, that would otherwise be a prey to ennui, and partly by the inherent pleasure of sympathetic grief, or by reviving the memory of our earliest youth in which they were first heard, or through national prejudices and mistaken pride, still give pleasure, at least to many who have heard nothing better. Grating discords, false tones and incoherent dissonances, universally give pain.

§ 3.

Of the Pleasures and Pains of the sense of Smelling.

49. THE pleasures we receive through this sense are, of all others, the most transient, for after a few minutes we either become insensible to them, or are satiated. Some scents are reviving, but not exactly pleasurable.

50. But the painful sensations communicated through the medium of this sense are far more numerous than the pleasures it imparts, and much more intense; for some are so powerful as to occasion instant death.

51. To some of the more moderate, many are reconciled by being long habituated to their endurance.

§ 4.

Of the Pleasures and Pains of Touch.

52. The *pleasures* from the touch are so few that they scarce need being mentioned; even that of *warmth* pleases only by the contrast with its antagonist, *cold*; that of *smoothness* is inconsiderable, though its opposite, *roughness*, causes much uneasiness. But the *pains* introduced through this sense, whether internal or external, are by far the most numerous, and occasionally the most intense to which our bodies are exposed. The qualities of the instruments that inflict or occasion pain are frequently applied metaphorically to mental pains, as *pungent*, *sharp* or *acute*, *excruciating*, *burning*, &c. Even *pleasures* that are comparatively held in least estimation are distinguished by terms derived from this sense, as *coarse*, *gross*;* so also moral objects, as *rough*, *rude*, *rugged* tempers or manners, in opposition to the *polished* and *delicate*, receive these denominations by reference to the touch.

§ 5.

* By *gross* pleasures are meant those that appear seated in the organs of sense, as those of *smell*, *taste* and *touch*. By refined pleasures I understand those that do not seem organic, as those of vision and those transmitted by the sense of hearing. Mental pleasures, not criminal, as that of revenge, belong also to this class.

§ 5.

Of the Pleasures and Pains of the Taste.

53. The pleasures and pains perceived by the taste elude every attempt of enumeration by their unlimited variety. Of the *pleasing*, the sweet is so prominent that it has been metaphorically applied both to beautiful objects and to the most pleasing sounds, and even to moral objects, as *temper*, &c. Of the most disagreeable tastes the *bitter*, the intensely *sour*, the *disgusting*, the *nauseous*, the *vapid* and *insipid* are chiefly distinguished :—these also are applied metaphorically to mental pains, censurable moral conduct, temper and actions ; thus we apply *bitterness* to grief sorrow and remorse ; *sourness* to ill temper ; *disgusting* or *nauseous* to certain offensive indecencies or improprieties ; *vapid* to spiritless ; and *insipid* or *maukish* to tasteless characters or compositions.

54. *Delicacy* and *delicateness*, both denote *refinement*, being derived from the Latin *licium*, the fine thread in a weaver's shuttle. Metaphorically both are applied to exquisite pleasures received through any of the senses, and also to the objects that afford them.

55. *Delicacies* refer principally to such objects as are most relished by the *taste* ; the sensations they impress are called
delicious,

delicious, a term frequently applied to exquisite pleasures of the body, and metaphorically, to those of the mind; and in this sense it stands in opposition to pleasures more *vulgar* and *common*.

56. When *delicacy* is attributed to the *touch* the assimilation to thread is still closer; for as in the literal sense, the finest thread is called *delicate* when smooth, even, and free from asperities, so in a metaphorical sense, the pleasures of most of the senses are called *delicate* in proportion to their *refinement*, in opposition to the *grosser* pleasures of gluttony, inebriation, inhuman shews or sports. indecent dances, barbarian uncouth music, silly amusements, &c.

57. Thus also it is applied to refined language, sentiments and manners, in opposition to the *rough*, *rude*, *coarse*, *blunt* and *unpolished*.

58. Farther, as the finest threads are most easily broken, so weak constitutions, being most easily injured, are called delicate, and so in general are circumstances and objects that require to be cautiously treated and attended to.

59. In prosecution of the above analogies, the purest critical taste in the polite arts is called *delicate*.

§ 6.

Of agreeable and disagreeable Sensations that affect the whole bodily Frame.

60. THE most pleasing of these are, 1st, the *general sensation of health* manifested by vivacity and high spirits; secondly, the pleasure of *convalescence*, and that felt on the *cessation of acute pain*. 3dly, *refreshment*, by satisfaction of the painful sensations of hunger and thirst; or 4thly, by *sound sleep*, or by *rest* after fatigue. 5thly, *Somnolency* leading to profound sleep. 6thly, *exercise*.

61. The corresponding uneasiness or pains are first *debility*, *languor*, *fainting* and *sickness*. 2dly, *hunger* and *thirst*. 3dly, *vigilance*. 4thly, *labours*. 5thly, *lassitude*.

62. We may observe, that many of these pains are far more intense, durable and numerous than their opposite pleasures, and that the degrees of which each is susceptible are various.

CHAP. III.

Of Mental Pleasures and Pains.

63. **BY** mental pleasures and pains I understand those we receive without the intervention of the external organs of sense ; these are numerous, but may be classed according to the capacities or powers (as they are commonly called) of the human mind to which they refer, and from which they appear to flow. These powers may conveniently be reduced to the six following ; *Animality*, or the power of receiving sensations (which, not being the immediate source of pleasures or pains, purely mental, is mentioned here only to render the division of human powers more exact and compleat,) *memory*, *imagination*, *understanding*, *will* or the elective power, the *moral sense*, and *affectibility*.

64. It is needless to observe, that these powers are nothing distinct from the soul itself, considered either as a subject in receiving sensations, ideas, emotions, desires and sentiments, or as an agent in willing or judging.

65. The pleasures and pains of *memory* consist in the ideal repetition of sensations originally received by *vision* and *audition* (if I may be permitted to denote by this word the sense
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of hearing) accompanied with the sentiments they suggest. See No. 18.

66. *Imagination* is the power of varying, by addition or subtraction, the order and species of ideas of sensations originally received either by the *eye* or the *ear**. To ideas of these sensations it seems to me confined, as Mr. Addison first noticed†, of which opinion were also Dr. Reid‡, Dr. Blair§, Dr. Johnson||, and Mr. Home¶; yet professor Stewart** and Mr. Edgworth‡‡ think the imagination may represent perceptions derived from all the senses; to this opinion I should accede, could I allow that we have, at least after a moderate interval, any idea of sensations derived from any of the other senses—at least, as to myself I cannot find that I possess any. Mr. Addison does not mention ideas of sensations received through the sense of hearing, nor does Dr. Johnson; plainly because neither of them had an ear for music.

67. Mr. Stewart allows, that though the greater part of the materials which the imagination combines, are supplied by objects of sight, yet insists that many pleasing images are

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borrowed

* This definition, which appears to me perfectly just, was, as far as I recollect, first given by Dr. Barnes, 1 Mem. Manchester, 382.

† Spectator, vol. 6. No. 411.

‡ On intellectual powers, chap. 4. p. 21. in 8vo.

§ 1 Blair, vol. 1. p. 56.

|| 2 Boswell's Life of Johnson, p. 534, and 3 Boswell, p. 23.

¶ Elements of Criticism, appendix, sec. 18.

** On the Mind, 483, in 8vo.

‡‡ 3. Edgworth on Education, 129.

borrowed from the fragrance of the fields and the melody of the groves; and that even the more gross sensations of taste form the subject of an ideal repast; in support of which, he quotes some lines of a poetical description of the *wonders of the torrid zone*, in nineteen lines of which there are only three that allude indeed to the sense of taste, but denote none in particular; they are the following:

“ Oh let me drain the cocoas bowl,
And “ Quick let me strip thee of thy spiny coat (the anana)
“ Spread thy ambrosial stores, and feast with Jove.”

Can the reader form any representation of cocoa milk, or of the taste of a pine apple?

68. However it must be owned, that the words *sweet*, *bitter*, *fragrant*, *fetid*, and such like epithets denoting objects of taste or smell, please or disgust us respectively, but they produce these effects, not by exciting corresponding ideas, but by suggesting the recollection that these terms were originally annexed, and are still applicable to sensations highly agreeable or disagreeable, obtained through those senses; as was first remarked by Dr. Berkeley*, and afterwards by Mr. Burke†, and allowed, though with some limitation, by professor Stewart‡.

69. The terms then that denote the pleasures or pains of the senses of taste, smell or touch afford notions of those
pleasing

* Introd. to Principles of Human Knowledge, § 20. Min. Philos. Dial. 7. § 8.

† Essay on the Sublime, &c. Part 5. § 3. and 4.

‡ Elements of the Philos. of the Mind, p. 502. 8vo.

pleasing or displeasing sensations ; but they cannot represent them, as terms expressive of visual or audible objects do ; thus I may have a mental representation of the house I live in, mount its stair and view its apartments ; I may also mentally repeat the sounds of a song I heard, admired and learned ; but to imagine the taste of the several dishes that form a mental repast, exceeds any power I possess. So I know well what a tooth-ach is, and also what hunger and thirst are ; but I cannot represent these pains, and consequently can form no idea of them according to the exact sense of this word.

70. The representation of sensible objects by the imagination, and the notions that accompany them, frequently occasion emotions or desires, as we experience in reading or hearing histories, poems, romances, novels, &c. but these sentiments belong not properly to the imagination, for though much weaker, they are not ideal, but are as *real* as the objects represented if *actually existing* would themselves excite ; for, as Mr. Stewart well remarks, we are deluded into a *transient belief* of the actual existence of such objects.* That they are not ideas, is evident from this, that we cannot feel emotions of *joy* or *grief*, &c. merely on hearing those words pronounced, as we can form ideas of a *house* or *tree*, when
named

* Elements, p. 142, &c.

named. Emotions cannot be elicited at pleasure ; they must be excited by appropriate descriptions and circumstances.

71. The imagination sometimes acquires the vigour of a sensation as in dreams, poetic transports, and the visions occasioned by mental derangement ; persons in that state, fancy they can see and hear, but never that they touch, smell or taste.—To an imagination thus invigorated I attribute the Scotch second sight, and the fancied *calls* mentioned in 3d Boswell's Life of Johnson, p. 263. See also 2 Crichton, 41, &c.

72. The *pleasures of imagination* arise either from *narratives*, true, or supposed to be so, and at the same time important or curious, properly arranged, and related in language correct, elegant and perspicuous, or even when known to be fictitious, as heroic poems, tragedies and romances, when they do not overleap all bounds of probability, but excite emotions, sublime, grand, marvellous or pathetic. And *novels* and *tales*, whether moral or merely amusing, exhibiting characters and personages of ancient or modern date engaged in adventures comic or serious, that by their novelty and variety attract and enchain our attention, and excite such emotions as the adventures would naturally suggest.

73. Or from *descriptions*, whether brilliant, splendid or picturesque ; or glowing, impressive and impassioned ; or ludicrous, comic, burlesque or sportive.

74. Or

74. Or from fancied *anticipations* of future gratifying events.

75. The *pains* peculiar to the imagination are derived either from an exorbitant estimation of present, or a true or delusive expectation of future evils.

76. The pleasing or displeasing impressions we receive on perusing or contemplating works addressed to the imagination, having some analogy to our relish or disrelish of different kinds of food, has thence obtained the name of *taste*. And as *sensual taste* may be true and just, or vitiated, corrupt and depraved, so may the mental. The analogy might be much farther extended, were this the proper place.

77. *Exercise* is the only pleasure, of which, as it appears to me, the understanding is susceptible. A pleasure so much the more intense as the exercise is more severe. It is attended with the most pleasing emotions of joy, or surprize, when it terminates in the discovery of some general and important truth, or useful invention, or plan of conduct.

78. And on the contrary it is attended with vexation and disappointment, on discovering incidental errors and mistakes, or with severe regret, at having been employed on trifling subjects, or applied to idle or pernicious purposes.

79. Compliance with the dictates of the *moral sense* is attended with self-satisfaction, and with the more exalted pleasure of conformity with the Divine will.

80. The

80. The violation of its dictates, in proportion to its criminality, is avenged by sentiments of self-condemnation, disquiet, sorrow, remorse and fear of punishment either in this life or the next.

81. The pleasures and pains of *affectibility* will be shewn in the next chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Pleasures and Pains arising from Affectibility.

82. *Affectibility*, considered as a distinct source of pleasure or pain, has not, as I conceive, been hitherto sufficiently attended to ; hence it is necessary I should explain the notion I form of it.

83. By affectibility then, I understand, that capacity, or passive property of the mind that renders it susceptible of pleasures and pains, distinct and different from those inherent in the perceptions of the senses, memory, imagination, understanding, or moral sense, though constantly preceding or following each of them.

84. Thus, suppose a man pinched with *hunger*, to have food set before him ; he is rejoiced. This *joy* is a pleasure surely distinct and different from the satisfaction of his appetite, or the *taste* of his food.

85. Again, suppose his food suddenly snatched from him, he is *vexed*, and this *vexation* is a pain very different from that of *hunger*, or unsatiated appetite.

86. Suppose sight bestowed on a person born blind ; before receiving it, he feels the pleasing *hope* of receiving a new source of pleasure and ardently *desires* it ; on its reception he feels a new *organic* pleasure, and after its reception he is rejoiced at the acquisition ; surely this *hope*, this *desire*, the *organic pleasure* of vision, and the subsequent *joy*, are perceptions very different from each other.

87. It were tedious, and, I hope, superfluous, to shew the distinction of the perceptions that originate in affectibility from the pleasures and pains inherent in those of the imagination and other faculties which have been already mentioned ; but it is proper to observe, that the mind is perfectly passive in their production, and cannot excite them by a mere act of the will, no more than the perceptions of *taste* ; they are therefore caused by the Great Author of Nature, acting differently on different predefined occasions, according to pre-established laws.

88. The pleasing and painful perceptions attributed to affectibility, may, in the point of view in which I here consider them, be reduced to three general heads ; *Emotions*, *desires*, and *sentiments*, all are susceptible of degrees, all are pleasing, or painful, or indeterminate, and when excessive, may be called *passions*.

89. These perceptions are as incapable of being defined as sensations, that is, the perceptions of the senses, tastes, smells, colours,

colours, &c. are known to be, but they may be *described* and discriminated by assigning the general causes and effects that characterise each ; and if mixed and compound, as some of them are, the ingredients of such compounds may be distinguished and developed.

90. In forming such descriptions with accuracy and elegance, Dr. Cogan has excelled all preceding writers. To him I am principally, but not invariably indebted for the grounds of those I attempted. His arrangement, though perfectly just with respect to classification, I have not followed ; that not being consistent with the end I had in view.

§ 1.

Of Emotions.

91. By emotions I understand those purely mental impressions, that produce a pleasing or displeasing change in the previous state of the mind, but do not of themselves, excite to action.

Pleasing.

92. *Joy* denotes the pleasure excited by the attainment, or confident expectation of some desired or desirable event, or 2dly. By escape or delivery from danger, whether felt or apprehended.

93. It is susceptible of various degrees, its highest is *exultation* or *transport*, its lowest *gladness*. Its highest induces a temporary oblivion of every thing else, even of preceding or concomitant pain, whether corporeal or mental if not excessive.

94. When

94. When considerable, it visibly affects the bodily organs, particularly the eyes and countenance ; and if accompanied with surprize, it has frequently produced insanity, and sometimes death.

95. Even when moderate it produces *complacency, satisfaction, good humour, alacrity and mirth.*

96. Perceptions of the *sublime, grand and magnanimous.* These are *emotions* quite distinct from the sensible objects that occasion them. Objects *may* indeed be grand and vast beyond our comprehension, but the impression such objects make upon us independently of their perception, is what is properly called the sense of the perception or sense of the *sublime, grand, magnanimous.* See No. 27 and 46.

97. The pleasing emotions excited by objects or sentiments *great and surprizing,* but not surpassing human power, or the energies of the human mind, are analagous but far inferior to the emotion of the sublime. Analogous to these are also the pleasing emotions excited by *wit.*

Displeasing.

98. *Sorrow* denotes the painful or displeasing emotions we feel at the happening or failure of an *event,* according as either of these is adverse to our interests, desires, wishes,
or

or expectation, or to those of our friends or persons to whom we are well affected.

99. It is susceptible of various degrees; the lowest is *concern*;—*affliction* denotes a higher, and *stupefaction* the highest.

100. *Grief* denotes the painful emotion we feel at the death of those we loved, admired or esteemed; its degrees are proportioned to those of these sentiments.

101. This emotion contains a mixture of the pleasing sentiments entertained for the person whose loss we deplore; inasmuch that we cherish with pleasure the memory of his person and actions, though it be at the same time painful.

102 *Sorrow* contains no such mixture, we feel no pleasure in contemplating the pains or misfortunes of our friends, notwithstanding the assertion of Rochefoucault.

103. *Regret* is not an emotion distinct from sorrow or grief, but denotes some degree of either. Its exciting causes are the same.

104. *Pity* denotes the painful impression we receive on beholding or considering the pains, misfortunes or dangers of others, in proportion to their magnitude, the relation the sufferers bear to us, and our sentiments with respect to them, suggesting a proportionate desire, or at least, wish of relieving their pains, rescuing them from danger, or alleviating their misfortunes. It extends even to the sufferings of brute animals, particularly if mild, innoxious and affectionate, but
scarcely

scarcely those that discover no sign of pain, as fish, insects, &c.

105. *Commiseration*, as Dr. Johnson well observed, differs from pity in this, that it includes no desire of relief.*

106. *Remorse* is the painful emotion which follows the judgment of self-condemnation for the commission of any immoral act or criminal neglect; or more shortly, it is a pain excited by the consciousness of guilt.

107. This pain is more or less violent according as the act or conduct that occasions it was more or less criminal, the frame of mind of the sufferer more or less sensible and tender, or stern, obdurate and insensible.

108. Its lower degrees are frequently unattended to, or patiently submitted to, rather than abandon the criminal pursuit that occasions it; to blunt its pungency it is often attributed to the prejudices of education, or unreasonable scrupulosity. But the highest degree produces the most tormenting agonies, despair, and even suicide.

109. *Repentance* is remorse acknowledged by the sufferer to be just, and therefore accompanied with regret, dislike, detestation or horror of the delinquency that occasions it, in proportion to its criminality or atrocity; a firm resolution of abandoning it in future, and an ardent desire of forgiveness by the person offended, particularly the Supreme Being; and of repairing, if possible, the wrong or injury committed.

110. *Anger*

* Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. 1. p. 365.

110. *Anger* is a painful emotion excited by a perception of an apparently unjust attack on our person, reputation or property or other rights, or on those of persons with whom we are connected by ties of love, friendship, or esteem. It is slight or aggravated, in proportion to our constitutional irritability, the apparent magnitude of the offence, and the relation the offender stands in towards us; thus we are more hurt by the infidelity of a wife, than by injuries received from a brother or sister; and more by the injustice of these than by that of remoter relatives; more by that of persons whom we have obliged, than of those with whom we are not so connected; more by wrongs suffered from inferiors, than by those committed by superiors; as the sense of the injuries received from superiors is tempered by the respect we owe them: hence the injuries of a father, unless extreme, are more calmly endured.

111. Anger, apparently *calm*, yet still subsisting, is called *resentment*—this too has its degrees; for there are *slight* and also *deep* resentments. Its lowest degree is called *displeasure*.

112. *Indignation* denotes a higher degree of anger, called forth by signal instances of ingratitude, perfidy, disappointment, or wounded pride.

113. *Rage* is the highest and most turbulent degree of anger, excited by the same causes, and embittered by aggravated circumstances, or uncommon irritability.

114. Of

114. Of all emotions *anger* is that which most frequently affects the whole frame ; its lowest degree is discernable in the eyes ; the higher degrees affect the eyes, lips, voice and eyebrows ; and the highest produce convulsions, short breathing, and sometimes death.

115.—Hence being the most turbulent of all emotions, it alone is called *passion* without addition, though all when violent may be so called.

116. But of all passions it most easily subsides and vanishes, when provoked by trifling causes ; its excess and injustice become apparent even to the angry person himself, and seem to him to demand some atonement on his part. This sudden recoil is observable in persons of a *benevolent* disposition, who are often the most irritable.

117. But in persons of a *malevolent* disposition, this passion, though apparently calmed, passes into a settled desire of revenge.

118. *Vexation*, when taken in a *passive sense*, is a mental disturbance compounded of two emotions, anger and sorrow : sometimes the one and sometimes the other is prevalent. It is caused by abuses of superior power, disappointments, unexpected delays, unsuccessful endeavours to please, incessant teasing, interruption in some interesting pursuit, &c.

119. In the *active sense*, namely to vex, is to excite such disturbance by abuse of power, litigation, or the various me-

thods of inflicting the pains above mentioned, or unjust legal incapacities.

120. *Shame* is a painful emotion, arising from a consciousness or even a suspicion of having incurred, or fear of incurring the disapprobation, contempt, or exciting disgust in others, particularly those we esteem.

121. It seems also to have been originally impressed as a restraint on any apparent indecency.

122. *Modesty*, that is, diffidence in one's own abilities to please or succeed in any undertaking, produces an uneasy emotion analagous to shame, when urged to any exertion.

123. *Fear* is a painful emotion, arising from the idea of some impending evil, expected with more or less probability or even suspected.

124. It is susceptible of various degrees, according to the constitution or sex of the person that feels it, the magnitude of the evil apprehended, its probability and proximity or distance, whether of time or space.

125. Its lower degrees suggest *caution* or *anxiety*. Its higher degrees, namely, *dread* or *terror*, especially if accompanied with *surprize*, produce *consternation* or *stupefaction*, that is, a suspension of all mental powers, and sometimes insanity and suicide. Its higher degrees are manifested on the countenance, and strangely affect and enfeeble the whole frame.

Indeter-

Indeterminate Emotions.

126. By *indeterminate* emotions I understand those that are pleasing, displeasing, or painful, according to the nature of the objects that excite them: these are *sympathy*, *expectation*, *surprise* and *wonder*.

127. *Sympathy* is an ideal participation of the pleasures or pains of others. It differs from pity 1° in this, that it equally accompanies the pleasures and pains of others, whereas pity is excited only by their pains. 2dly in this, that pity is a painful emotion, and excites a desire of relieving its object; whereas sympathy, even with pain, is a pleasing emotion, and excites no desire of relief;—for we feel it for persons who are incapable of receiving any, as historical or fictitious personages. 3dly, we pity corporeal pains, but we do not sympathize with them*.—We feel no participation of a tooth-ach or fever, though we pity the sufferer.

128. As corporeal pains are incapable of participation, so are corporeal pleasures; we may be pleased with those enjoyed by our friends, or even rejoiced, but we cannot sym-
G 2
pathize

* This emotion has been so profoundly investigated by Dr. Adam Smith, that he was enabled to deduce from it many important moral phænomena in his *Treatise on Moral Sentiments*, a work of transcendant merit. A few of his observations I here briefly state.

pathize with them. Yet we may be shocked and even struck with horror, at the sight or even the imagination of the pains suffered by persons to whom we are perfect strangers, or even by the dangers to which they are exposed, not indeed of those that engage in mortal combat, but we sympathize with the courage that urges them to meet such dangers. We strongly commiserate the pains of the wounded.

129. Through the benevolence of the Author of Nature, we strongly participate in the mental pains undeservedly felt by others, because they are in some measure relieved by such participation if we are present, and even in our absence, if the sufferer knows that all well disposed persons would sympathize with him; but as corporeal pains are incapable of such relief, sympathy with them would be useless, and pity even grievous.

130. Mental pleasures receive less increase by participation, and hence our sympathy with them, though considerable, is more moderate. But the participation of others in the pleasures we ourselves enjoy, greatly heightens them, if such pleasures be not essentially exclusive.

131. To this principle we may also ascribe the pleasure we take in the agreement of others in our favourite opinions; for some share of confidence is of the very essence of opinion, and this confidence is encreased by the concurrence of others; and on the contrary we are in some degree displeased by contradiction. Hence tyrants force, at least an outward conformity

conformity of opinion with their own ; though conscious that by the application of force they can produce no other effect than hypocrisy or even blasphemy.

132. From sympathy we may also derive the pleasure we receive from lively descriptions of the passions and emotions not only of the milder kind, but even of the irascible, when felt by persons for whom we are interested, whether real or fictitious, such as are presented to us by poets and writers of romances or novels ; in this case the imagination deludes us with a transient belief of their existence,* while we voluntarily abstract from, or are inattentive to, the circumstances that would destroy the delusion ; the more easily and completely this abstraction is found, the stronger the delusion ; hence theatrical representations exhibited by skilful actors, accompanied with appropriate scenery, and allied with suitable music, are of all others the most impressive and fascinating.

133. *Expectation* is an instinctive emotion, impelling us more or less forcibly, to believe the future existence of any object, its force being proportioned to its supposed certainty, or probability.

Hence

* Such is the opinion of Professor Dugald Stewart, on the Mind, p. 151. in 8mo., and of Dr. Priestly, Lectures on Oratory, p. 89, 4to. It is strongly opposed by Dr. Johnson in his Preface to Shakespeare, 2d fugitive pieces, p. 114. and Professor Scott's Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, p. 248. Both deserve to be consulted.

134. Hence the emotion may be agreeable, pleasing, or delightful ; or on the contrary disagreeable or painful, according to the pleasing or displeasing nature of the object expected.

135. This force (or *confidence* as it is commonly called) may be increased beyond the proportion it ought to bear to the probability of the object, by the desires or fear which the object expected inspires ; or on the contrary it may be diminished or rendered nearly evanescent by inattention to the real probability of its object, temerity or presumption.

136. The *failure* of an agreeable expectation produces the pain called *disappointment*, more or less afflicting, according to the ardour with which the object expected was desired, and its apprehended probability. On the contrary, the failure of a disagreeable expectation occasions *gladness*, *joy*, or *delight*, according to the magnitude of the evil expected and its probability.

137. The lowest degree of expectation or belief is called *suspicion*. It is founded on low or remote probabilities, and in weak minds even on mere possibilities. It frequently originates in malignity.

138. *Suspense* is that state of mind in which, upon a view of opposite probabilities, or from inattention to their examination, no expectation or belief is formed. It is *painful*, when the importance of the subject is duly felt.

139. *Surprise*

139. *Surprise* is a sudden emotion excited by the perception, discovery or invention of any fact or object inconsistent with our former experience or expectation—or beyond it, when we have any reason to form any. Such are the discoveries of Magnetic, Electric or Galvanic powers; of the principle of Attraction, and many other modern discoveries; the invention of the Steam Engine, &c. the Phenomena of Volcanos, Earthquakes or other extraordinary events.

140. It is *pleasing*, when the exciting objects are extraordinary, curious or interesting, and unattended with danger to ourselves.

Displeasing, when its objects are disagreeable or hurtful, or cruel as the unexpected death of a friend, the victory of an enemy, &c. It is susceptible of many degrees.

141. *Wonder* is an emotion analogous to surprise, for we are surprised by the *existence* of an unexpected object; but its *cause* is the object of our wonder. It is either pleasing or displeasing, according to the nature of its object, and is susceptible of many degrees.

142. When *pleasing*, it is associated with approbation of its object, and is called *admiration*. It is excited by the beautiful, the sublime, the grand, the magnanimous, and the affecting.

• *Discovery* is bringing to light and making known something that did *exist before*, but was concealed from common observation. To *invent* is to produce something that *did not exist before*. Dugald Stewart.

affecting. Or by signal, physical or mental abilities, moral excellence, or power beneficently exerted.

143. Its degrees are proportioned to those of the qualities or abilities that demand it, and the sensibility or affectibility of the person in whom it is excited. Its highest degrees are *astonishment*, *enthusiastic pleasure*, or *rapture*; but this is produced only by music. Not only these qualities, but the persons that possess them are objects of admiration.

144. Those that possess superior *intellectual* abilities are called great men, as *Aristotle*, *Newton*, *Euler*, *Locke*, *Berkeley*, *Grotius* and *Aquinas*; but those that excel in arts derived from the imagination, are not called *great men* but *great poets*, *great painters*, &c. Yet as great musicians, such as *Handel* and *Sacchini* (if such be) excite astonishment, and fascinate the senses, I think they too may be called *great men*.

145. When wonder is associated with remorse, or aroused by any dreadful object in a higher degree, it is called *amazement*, and excites horror and stupefaction; its lower degrees produce perplexity and anxiety. Insensibility to remorse is called obduracy; self-possession in perplexing circumstances, is called *presence of mind*.

146. When associated with *reprobation*, it has no particular name, but inspires a proportionate degree of abhorrence, detestation and indignation.

147. When

147. When associated with *simple disapprobation*, it produces, blame, censure or contempt.

147. *Horror* is the shock or emotion we feel at the sight of any terrific object, or on being apprized of some enormous crime. It is, as Dr. Cogan observes, the antipode of *admiration*.

§ 2.

Of Desires.

148. *Desire* is a complicative word denoting uneasiness at the want or absence of an agreeable object, pleasure in contemplating it, and a strong inclination to its attainment; thus it excites to action, and so differs from *emotions*.

149. A *wish* is an imperfect desire, including a slight uneasiness; without any, or at least only a slight inclination to attain its object.

150. Hence we see that desires include both pain and pleasure, and according as either predominates they are either painful or pleasing.

151. A *Desire* including not only an inclination, but a *firm* will or determination to attain its object is called *resolution*,

the general appellation of all fixed determinations of the will, on whatever motive grounded.

152. Desires that tend solely to the gratification of animal wants are called *appetites* : as they do not fall under the head of affectibility, they are foreign to the present enquiry.

153. *Love* is the desire of procuring pleasure to its object, even by the sacrifice, if necessary, of one's own.

154. Its degree may be estimated by that of the pleasure desired, and of that sacrificed to its attainment ; of the pain endured and the obstacles overcome.

155. Love is susceptible of various modifications according to the nature of the objects towards which it is directed.

156. *Parental Love* is that which parents bear to their children. It is founded partly on instinct, a feeling evidently impressed by the Supreme Being, (and which, were there no other, is alone a sufficient proof of his existence) for the preservation of the species ; and partly on the consideration, that they are part of ourselves, owe us respect and obedience, and have with us a community of interest.

157. The love founded on instinct is inversely as the age of the offspring and its power of self-preservation ; but in our species it is never totally extinguished. That founded on selfish consideration may increase with the age of the offspring—it may be obliterated by disrespect, reiterated instances of disobedience, disregard to a common interest, opposition

position to the interest of the parent, or by atrocious crimes ; and conversely it may be increased by the merit of the offspring, and dutiful, affectionate behaviour.

158. *Filial love*, or that of children to their parents is also founded on instinct, but an instinct much weaker than of parents for them. It is increased by the benefits we receive from them ; it is diminished by second marriages, a separation or opposition of interests, or partiality to one of the brethren.

159. *Fraternal love* arises from an instinct still weaker than the foregoing, and partly on the mutual and immediate relation to common parents, (hence it is weaker when one of the parents is different from that of the other,) and partly on a sense of community of interests. It is encreased by mutual protection and similarity of character, and diminished by the partiality of either of the parents to one of them, and opposition of interests.

160. *Love of more distant relations* is founded on the same principles, but weakened in proportion to their distance from the common stock.

161. Love founded on consanguinity or alliance or friendship is called *affection*.

162. *Sexual love*, this also arises 1st from an instinct implanted in the constitution of all animals, and more permanently in the human species, destined to perpetuate life ; yet

when confined to mere instinct it can scarcely be called love, for this instinct seeks not the happiness of its object, but rather its own selfish gratification, and hence is deservedly stigmatised by the degrading appellation of *lust*.

163. But 2dly, in civilized nations and generous minds, endowed with sensibility, mental and moral considerations are superadded to the instinctive. A mild, social and affectionate disposition, inferred from external appearance, or known by long and intimate acquaintance, intellectual abilities, entertaining talents, congenial pursuits not unsuitable to the sex, and irreproachable conduct, inspire an *eager desire* of receiving and bestowing every possible and consequently wholly undivided happiness on the person in whom such excellencies are found, and of exciting a similar reciprocal desire in the beloved object.—I say *undivided*, as this desire is necessarily exclusive of all participation, as pleasure imparted to any other would amount to a full proof that the mind was not entirely gained, a possession which nevertheless *love*, truly so called, essentially requires. In this respect it differs from parental and filial affections, which are gratified by the happiness of their respective objects, whatever source it may proceed from, not incompatible with the share of affection they themselves naturally claim.

164. Hence *polygamy* is incompatible with true love, the most refined pleasure of which human nature is capable and the firmest bond of social union.

165. Love

165. Love commences with *admiration*, and if supported by *hope*, advances to *fondness*; an ardent desire of pleasing; an anxious fear of displeasing the beloved object; inattention to such of its faults (not vices) as do not directly interfere with the hope of its exclusive possession, and the social happiness of the conjugal state. Thus supported, it is pleasing in proportion to its ardour. But if haunted by perplexing doubts; irritated by unexpected obstacles; distracted by jealousy, it then, in proportion to its intensity, either settles in sullen displeasure, or becomes a gloomy, or a vehement and impetuous passion of the most painful and tormenting kind, often verging to, or terminating in insanity or suicide.

166. *Fondness* and *tenderness* are the inseparable attendants of genuine love. *Fondness* denotes the pleasure of beholding the beloved object, and consequently desire of its presence. *Tenderness* consists in an exquisite sensibility to whatever may please, and anxiety to prevent whatever may even be suspected to injure or displease the object of one's love or affection.

167. *Self-love*, in the proper sense of the word, perhaps does not exist, as Mr. Hume has remarked*, and Mr. Usher†. We find no pleasure in our own society, (if I may so speak,) when debarred of any other, nor willingly think or converse
with

* Treatise on Human Nature, vol. 2. p. 96.

† Theory of the Human Mind, 3 Fugitive Pieces, p. 147.

with ourselves as we do with those we love. Or, if we feel any pleasure, it is in contemplating some other object.

168. However this may be, (for it will bear debate) it is certain that *selfishness* exists; that is, a preference, or at least a bias or inclination to our own pleasure or interest to that of others. It is happily counterbalanced by benevolent instincts, the dictates of the moral sense, the precepts of religion, and in some cases by the fear of punishment, or possibly of degradation in the opinion of others; at least this is what usually happens.

169. *Love of God*, this, though not instinctive, (as his existence is known to us only by instruction or reflection) is of all other affections the most just and natural, and, if universal, would alone be sufficient to produce the happiness of mankind. What more natural and just than to love our real *Father*, the author of every pleasure and comfort we enjoy?

170. This love consists, not in endeavouring to procure him any new pleasure, which is impossible; but in ardent undissembled gratitude for the benefits received from him; vigilant attention to the execution of his commands; confidence in his goodness, and resignation to his will in the most adverse circumstances. This requital he expects from us in the language of the most passionate lover—*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy strength.*

171. *Desire*

171. *Desire of society*, this also seems instinctive; for from our infancy perfect solitude is shunned with horror. Even the deaf, who cannot communicate with each other or with any one else, prefer company to solitude. The aversion of the savage of Aveyron to society proceeded from original ill treatment received by him. Yet this desire, as far as it is instinctive, extends only to the society of two or three persons or families; its farther extension arises from reflection on its utility for defence against enemies or wild beasts, or assistance in laborious works. The pleasure received from its enjoyment is *increased* by similarity of language, habits, manners and pursuits; and *diminished* by dissimilarity in those respects.

172. *Desire of communication*, this comprehends colloquial intercourse and sympathy. Both may be had, even with the dead, by means of *reading*, and often more agreeably than with the living. The former is *encreased* in proportion to the interest it inspires, and the attention given to it; and *diminished* by inattention, rude interruption, blunt contradiction, arrogant imperious dictation. Of the nature of *sympathy*, mention has been already made, No. 127: to its desire that of seeing theatrical representations, pantomime shews, and of contemplating expression of the passions, either by painting, statuary, or music, or by affecting tales either in prose or verse, must be ascribed. Pleasures of the comic kind are derived from a different source.

173. The

173. *Love of the marvellous or extraordinary.*—The mind is rendered sensible of its existence only by the vividness of its perceptions ; hence it is scarcely conscious of it during sleep or a fainting fit. Now the relation, and much more the sight of any thing extraordinary or marvellous, in proportion as it is so, strongly attracts or absorbs our attention, excites the pleasing emotion of surprize, and consequently when unattended with any apprehension of personal injury or danger, becomes extremely agreeable.

Hence the sight, or even a detailed account of shipwrecks, hard fought battles, the relation of romantic adventures, even if improbable, seldom fail to gratify us, particularly in early youth, when their improbability is not fully discerned.

174. *Desire of ideal pleasures ;* this is probably felt in a very superior degree by those that have the happy talent of gratifying their imagination, by assembling and connecting pleasing images and associations, in music, poetry, painting, statuary, or entertaining narratives or delineations of human life.

175. *Desire of knowledge, or curiosity.*—Though this desire is characteristic of the human species, yet it is very unequally distributed among the individuals that compose it ; in some it scarcely exists, in others it amounts to a passion, whose unceasing gratification from the successive attainment of its numerous objects is attended with inexpressible pleasure.

176. *Desire*

176. *Desire of intellectual exercise*, that is study.—This desire is nearly allied to the last, and is often necessary to its attainment: it differs from it in this, that in the acquisition of knowledge, the mind is frequently passive, or at most, barely bestows attention; whereas in study, profound reflection, vigorous exertion, and extensive researches are indispensable. Yet they are all attended with supreme delight.

177. *Desire of amusement*.—In civilized societies we may distinguish three classes; one daily engaged in corporeal exertions; another in toilsome professional pursuits, and a third attached to no particular occupation or object of pursuit, and therefore idle. To the first mere *rest* affords much pleasure; yet even to them the amusements of dancing, singing and shews are far from indifferent, and in some countries are eagerly sought. To the second class, amusements, if not absolutely necessary, are at least highly agreeable. But to the third they are indispensably necessary to save them from the misery of *ennui*, that languor in which the soul seems oppressed by its own weight, and anxiously requires some new and powerful perceptions.

178. In mere amusements the mind is purely passive, though from long continued attention, fatigue is at last felt.

179. The more refined amusements are derived from chaste and polished theatrical representations, music and select en-

tertaining books. The less refined from shews, farces, &c. and the grossest and most vulgar, from games of hazard.

180. Some amusements participate of *studies*, as various games, particularly that of *chess*; solution of *enigmas*, &c. these are chiefly valuable for being easily procured.

181. *Desire of change*, or love of *novelty*. When the mind has bestowed sufficient consideration on any object for any considerable time, farther attention to it being superfluous, it naturally declines; to excite it some new object becomes necessary, as attention alone can save us from *ennui*. *Vilia sunt nobis quæcunque prioribus annis—Vidimus, & sordet quodcumque spectavimus olim.* No one is struck with the prospect of the rising sun, but we run to see an insignificant meteor.

182. *Desire of gain*.—This, when *rationally* pursued, leads to industry, that is, to employment of the means fitted to procure the necessaries and comforts of life, suitable to one's rank, to guard against future wants, and to permit occasional acts of benevolence; but when extravagantly pursued, it becomes what Shakespeare justly calls *staunchless avarice*, which aims at the accumulation of riches without a view to an appropriate end, other than that of mere accumulation; it sometimes (though rarely) becomes so outrageous a passion as to prevent expenditure even to procure the comforts of life, and may well be deemed a species of partial insanity.

183. *Emulation* denotes the animating desire of equalling others in the attainment of any praiseworthy object; hence

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it may be defined the *desire of equality*. It is sometimes taken for the desire of *surpassing* others ; but I think improperly. Emulation is just, but the desire of excelling others is not always just, but frequently malevolent, and borders on the detestable sentiment of envy*. I applaud Cæsar, who could bear no superior ; but detest Pompey, who could suffer no equal.

184. *Desire of distinction*.—This desire is manifestly selfish, as it urges to the endeavour of attracting the attention of others to one's self. It is honorable or vicious, ridiculous or indifferent, according to the means it employs to attain its object. When it excites to pursuits conducive to the happiness of the whole, or any large portion of the human species, it is laudable ; when on the contrary it aims at success by the commission of crimes that astonish mankind, such as that of Eratostrates, who set fire to the temple of Ephesus, it excites horror and detestation. But it is still more hateful when it aims at admiration, (a sentiment which men have hitherto been stupid enough to bestow on many monsters) by the oppression and conquest of unoffending nations. Nay I have seen some so silly as to feign drunkenness to attract attention by their extravagancies :—in such it is *truly contemptible*. To endeavour to attain distinction by superior skill or adroitness, in particular amusements or exercises, is perhaps mere mat-

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* Yet I own that in Latin *Æmulatio* is capable of both senses. See the profound and accurate treatise of Mr. Hill on *Latin Synonimes*.

ter of *indifference*; the silly affectation of appearing happier than we really are, and valuing ourselves, and expecting distinction and superior attention from the possession of mere external advantages, or even from an *ostentatious display* of those that more truly belong to us as superior knowledge, splendid abilities, eminent talents, political address, &c. all these frivolities are denoted by the name of *vanity*, and are merely *ridiculous*.*

185. *Desire of superiority in any pursuit*.—This is nearly allied to *emulation*; but as I already said, seems to differ from it; for the desire of equality is merely defensive of a natural right; whereas the desire of superiority to others is tinged with pride, and an usurpation of that distinction to which others have an equal claim: both are odious, when to attain their object, they endeavour to depreciate the *real* merit of others engaged in the same pursuits. I say *real*, because the detection of falsehood or error in religion, philosophy, politics, history, or even in taste, is in most cases either important, or advantageous to mankind.

186. *Ambition*, or the desire of obtaining political honours or power. The desire of receiving the former without deserving them by public services, betrays a ridiculous vanity; but the pursuit of that portion of legal power open to subjects, attended with the resolution of executing the duties it imposes,

* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 376.

imposes, is perfectly just and honorable. The ambition of conquest or of despotic power should meet with general abhorrence*.

187. *Desire of esteem*.—Esteem denotes the value we set on any person, for the agreeable or useful qualities we deem him to possess ; hence the desire of obtaining it stimulates us to the acquisition of those qualities, and the pursuit of the line of conduct that deserves it. When *rational* it is satisfied with the approbation of the true judges of merit ; when *extravagant* it seeks universal applause, and often by means either undue or even base.

188. This desire, though natural to man, evidently exists in different individuals in different degrees, in some perhaps not at all ; and these are invariably the worst characters.

189. *Courage* is the resolute animating desire of opposing or encountering danger, when such opposition is attended with any probability of success, or even without such probability, if opposition is commanded. But if success be utterly improbable, then opposition (not commanded) is unreasonable, and is called *rashness*. Fortitude denotes that strength of mind that enables us to support affliction with firmness, composure, decency and dignity. *Pusillanimity* denotes the want of it.

190. Courage

* See some excellent remarks on this subject in 2d Edgeworth on Education, p. 76, in 8vo.

190. Courage derives its merit solely from the motives that influence its exertions ; when these are just and proper it is highly commendable, but when unjust it excites a proportionate degree of indignation and contempt.

191. *Patriotism*, or the love of our country denotes the attachment we feel for the laws, customs and manners of the nation in which we were born and educated, or the tribe to which we belong, whose language we speak, of whose name and repute we participate, comprehending our families, friends and possessions, and all that is dear to us.

192. This attachment is manifested, when our country is invaded, or even menaced or insulted by a foreign foe ; being then combined with desire of the esteem, praise, and applause of our countrymen, it stimulates to the contempt of danger and the most heroic exertions. *Vincit amor Patriæ laudumque immensa Cupido.* But as a sensible writer remarks, patriotism that injures any portion of mankind for the sake of a particular country is but a more extended selfishness, and highly criminal.

193. *Gratitude* is the desire of giving pleasure in return for that received or intended, and is manifested by due acknowledgments. Such return of kindness is by well disposed minds considered as a debt of the most sacred nature, and its neglect, and still more the failure of discharging it when possible, is deservedly condemned by the common voice of mankind.

mankind. But to requite it with injury is a crime of the deepest die, and so much more heinous, as the benefit conferred was more considerable and less to be expected.

Painful.

194. *Love of Revenge.* This consists in a deliberate, proud, persevering desire of the pleasure of inflicting pain on a hated object, in return for that received by some offence, and equal or superior to it. I say *proud*, because its gratification requires that the offender should know that the pain he suffers proceeds from the person offended, and marks his superiority.

195. This desire frequently rises to a tormenting passion, incapable of any alleviation but from the ardent hope of its final gratification. It exists chiefly among savages, and odious as it is, it is perhaps necessary to prevent them from injuring each other.

§ 3.

Of Sentiments.

196. *Sentiments* are impressions that arise in the mind, in consequence of the favourable or unfavourable opinion it entertains of its own merit or demerit, or of that of others.

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197. They differ from *emotions*, as these arise from facts or events, and not from opinion. And from *desires*, as these excite to actions. Whereas sentiments, merely as such, may subsist without any tendency to action, though it must be allowed that desires frequently originate from them.

198. There is one sentiment however of a mixt nature, as comprizing both a desire and an emotion, namely, *hope*, which is compounded of *desire* and *expectation*; it is therefore susceptible of various degrees, according to the strength of the desire, and the apprehended probability of the object expected.

Sentiments favourable to ourselves or to others are *pleasing*; those that are unfavourable are *displeasing* or painful.

199. *Self estimation* is the just value which a man sets on his character, conduct and upright intentions. It is often, though improperly mistaken for pride.* *Content* and *satisfaction* seem to me rather negations of desire than positive sentiments.

200. *Pride* consists in an overrated estimation of our own merit, power, rank, knowledge or other abilities beyond their real importance, or of the reputation we have gained, or the esteem in which our merit or abilities are held or (as we suppose) ought to be held by others.

201. *Presumption*

* See some just and subtle remarks on this subject in 2 Edgeworth on Education, p. 56, in 8vo.

201. *Presumption* is a sentiment grounded on an opinion that we possess a degree of merit, or abilities equal to an undertaking, to the due execution of which they are in reality inadequate. It is susceptible of various degrees, in proportion to this inadequacy.

202. *Self-sufficiency* denotes such confidence in the sufficiency of the knowledge or abilities we possess, as precludes any endeavour to encrease them, or even the suspicion that they are capable of any increase.

203. *Arrogance* is an undue claim of superiority over equals, or of equality with superiors.

204. *Haughtiness* denotes the expression of pride and unmerited contempt of others, either by words or demeanor.

205. *Contempt* is a sentiment flowing from the real or supposed worthlessness, meanness, absurdity, imbecility or folly of its object, or its degradation by crimes or actions of a shameful kind.

206. *Disdain*, when *just*, is a sentiment proudly repulsive of an act or conduct incompatible with self-estimation, and unworthy of one's character.

207. When *unjust* it consists in unmerited contempt of persons whom it insolently regards as inferior, and consequently unworthy of notice. It is generally found in *upstarts*, that is, persons suddenly raised to riches, power, or honours.

208. Its extreme degree is *scorn*.

209. *Derision* denotes the pleasure found in rendering, or finding another ridiculous, that is, an object of laughter.

210. All these sentiments, however displeasing, disgusting, or painful to the persons who are their objects, afford a malevolent pleasure to the person who feels them.

211. *Friendship* is a pleasing sentiment of affectionate attachment betwixt different individuals. It is not grounded on any instinct, but solely on the pleasing qualities of its object; similarity in such inclinations and pursuits as are not necessarily exclusive; participation of common dangers, and agreeable social intercourse.

212. It is strengthened by duration, and benefits mutually conferred. Hence it was much stronger in ancient times, when sufficient protection could not be obtained from the laws. It commonly exists betwixt persons of the same sex, but oftener betwixt men than betwixt women. With respect to persons of different sexes conjugally united, it is essential to their mutual happiness, and in proportion to the sensibility of either, the want of it is productive of misery. It may also exist betwixt persons of different sexes not conjugally united, if both are advanced in age, or at least if one far surpasses the other in that respect; but if both are young, it gradually, and perhaps imperceptibly, passes into *love*.

213. *Esteem*

213. *Esteem* denotes the value we set on persons possessed of superior intellectual abilities, and *their works*, or uncommonly attentive to the performance of moral duties. It is capable of many degrees.

214. *Regard* indicates the particular favourable attention of which we think another worthy. It is susceptible of many degrees.

215. *Respect* implies not only the regard, but also the deference, complaisance and some degree of preference and submission which we deem due to its object; and even to contemptible men when placed in respectable situations.

216. *Veneration* denotes profound respect, mixed with awe. It is bestowed on persons sunk in the vale of years, particularly if distinguished by meritorious services, wisdom or virtues. It may be repelled by criminal conduct through life, or even by a degree of levity unbecoming advanced age. Who could venerate *Frederick* the infamous, *Buffon* or *Voltaire*, had they even reached the age of Methusalem?

Displeasing.

217. *Humility* is well defined by Dr. Cogan, the sense of our own deficiency in intellectual or moral excellencies ; to which we may add, rank, fame and power, or the sense of our own deformity or despicable appearance. It differs much from *humiliation*, which consists in a painful depression of pride or self-estimation.

218. *Resignation* denotes humble submission to the endurance of pain, on the pleasing persuasion that such acquiescence is grateful to the Supreme Being. It is therefore a mixed sentiment of pain and pleasure, though the pain commonly preponderates.

219. *Patience* also denotes calm submission to the endurance of pain or affliction, but from a less elevated motive, namely, the persuasion of the inutility and aggravating tendency of vexation, or the necessity of its endurance to the production of some preponderating good.

Painful.

220. *Irksomeness*, that peculiar uneasiness and weariness arising from protracted indefinite expectation, and more commonly from the want of pursuit or attention to any object.

ject. To shun it recourse is had to the most trifling, and often to criminal pursuits.

221. *Impatience* is the corroding reluctance of the mind to the delay of any expected pleasure, or the endurance of pain. It differs from vexation, by containing no mixture of anger, but it frequently passes into it.

222. *Discontent* denotes the uneasiness we feel on a view of the inadequacy of our circumstances to the gratification of our desires, whether just and reasonable, or wild and unreasonable ; or from oppression whether real or fancied.

223. *Melancholy* is a permanent feeling of grief or sorrow arising from a persuasion that the loss or evil we deplore, is irretrievable, and such as renders all future happiness impossible. It is susceptible of various degrees as *dejection*, *apathy*, *terror* and *delirium*.

224. *Despair* is a sentiment arising from the supposed impossibility of the cessation of a present, or of preventing a future evil.

225. *Jealousy* is a sentiment arising from an apprehension of the success of a rival in any pursuit, whom we suppose less worthy of it than ourselves.

226. *Jealousy in Love* denotes the pain resulting from any favour conferred on another by the beloved object ; it frequently arises to an outrageous passion mixed with resentment, indignation and rage.

227. *Envy*

227. *Envy* is a painful feeling of the superiority of another, either in talents, rank or condition, attended with the malignant endeavour to depreciate his merit, or deprive him of his envied advantages.

228. *Aversion* or *dislike* is opposite to *desire*. It implies pleasure at the absence, and pain, uneasiness or disgust at the *presence* of its object. It is capable of many degrees, and relates either to persons or to things; its highest degree is *horror*.

229. *Hatred* is opposite to love, and, as relative to persons, consists in aversion combined with a malignant pleasure at any evil that may befall the person hated, and a *wish* that it may happen. In this it differs from *malice*, which denotes a deliberate design of inflicting evil on its object, and if inveterate and implacable, is termed *rancour*.—Its degrees are detestation, abhorrence and execration.

230. But it also may have for its object certain vices, states or conditions; thus we may hate injustice, detest tyranny, abhor slavery, execrate cruelty, &c.

231. I shall now explain what I mean by *simple* and *complex* pleasures and pains. *Simple* pleasures are those that arise from a simple source, as those of parental love, and of filial love. *Complex* pleasures are those which arise from different sources, which harmonize and coincide with each other, and thus render the compound pleasure
more

more intense. Thus the pleasure of gratifying the suggestions of pity is increased by coinciding with the dictates of the moral sense. The pleasure derived from the esteem of another, is heightened by the sentiment of esteem entertained for him that confers it. *Laudari a laudato maxima laus est.*

Simple pains are those of anger, sorrow, remorse, &c.

Complex pains are those that coincide with each other, and thus rendered more intense and pungent. Thus the emotion of *remorse* is imbittered by that of *grief*, as that of *Alexander* for the death of *Clitus*, so the sentiment of *envy* is aggravated by that of hatred for the object envied.

232. I here conclude the first branch of the present enquiry, having, if I mistake not, enumerated all the pleasureable and painful perceptions of which the human mind is capable, and assigned precise definitions of the terms by which they are denoted. For a more elaborate and detailed account of each, I must refer the reader to the elegant and luminous descriptions of Dr. Cogan.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

§ 1.

Of the different States of Mankind.

HAVING thus detailed and distinctly described the various pleasures and pains which mankind are capable of receiving, and their various degrees, it now remains to examine which of these opposite perceptions, the pleasing or the painful do at present, or have at any past period, as far as can be known, always predominated during the whole course of human existence.

On a question of so vast an extent, to venture on such a decision as the known data will permit, we must view the condition of our species in each of the four different states in which it anciently existed, or is at present found. These are, the *Patriarchal*, the *Barbarian*, the *Savage*, and the *Civilized*.

§ 2.

§ 2.

Of the Condition of Mankind during the Patriarchal State.

THE patriarchal state is that in which men lived under the government of a common parent ; that this was the state of mankind during the life of Adam their universal parent, appears by the testimony of Moses, the most ancient and respectable of all historians. His sons Cain and Abel lived with him, and were subject to him for many years. Cain, even after his banishment, we cannot suppose emancipated from the dominion of his father.

While Adam lived, that is, during 930 years, men must have been very numerous, and in great measure civilized ; for agriculture was practised, the metallurgic arts invented, the sciences cultivated, and cities built, the lives of men being then extended to an extraordinary length ; after the death of Adam the same authority subsisted for many ages in the common fathers of numerous families, nor do we read of any disorders until a few ages before the deluge. In the preceding period it is probable that the descendants of Seth, at least, enjoyed as much happiness as is now found in civilized states ; but as no memorials of the condition of man-

kind before the flood at present exist, it is impossible to estimate with any precision the proportion of pleasure and pain it then enjoyed.

After the flood, during the lives of Noah and of his three sons, the patriarchal government must have subsisted over their respective families until the dispersion, that is, during 537 years. Of the events that took place during that period, we are almost entirely ignorant; but it appears that great harmony prevailed among men, for with a few exceptions they were with some difficulty induced to separate from each other. Hence the golden age is said to have existed during that period.

After the dispersion, the *general* patriarchal government necessarily ceased, as different languages were spoken by each of the families descended from the same patriarch. Some remained in Chaldea, over whom Nimrod a distinguished huntsman soon obtained the sovereignty. Many of the arts and sciences before known, must have been preserved by them, since Nimrod was enabled to build Babylon and some other cities; others retained some imperfect knowledge of the most necessary arts; particularly those that settled in Assyria, Persia and Lower Asia. These in time became numerous; those of the same race collecting under a common chief formed tribes, whose members indefinitely increasing, formed new tribes, all speaking the same language,
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and denominated either from their primitive ancestor, or from their mode of living, their situation, or some other peculiarity. Different tribes coalescing either by conquest, or from various causes which need not be here examined, formed, in process of time, petty principalities, kingdoms or empires; I shall call them *barbarian* for reasons that will soon be seen. Of those that occupied Upper Asia, or settled in Europe, some were prevented by the sterility of the soil, or the difficulty of clearing it of immense forests, from cultivating the spots they occupied. Thus the knowledge of agriculture was gradually lost; but the various contrivances for subduing wild animals and catching fish being of constant and indispensable use were universally retained. Of these vagrant families, tribes and even principalities or kingdoms were formed after some ages.

A *partial* patriarchal government seems to have subsisted during several ages among the descendants of *Sem*; nay it exists at this day among the *Bedouin* Arabs, and other tribes of that singular people: as it was the primordial state of mankind, and as some accidents relative to it have been transmitted to us, which occurred in the most ancient times of which history gives us any account, I shall now examine 1^o what degree of happiness or misery these events seem to indicate to have been the result of this ancient patriarchal

government; and 2dly, what the condition of the Arabs is who still maintain it.

§ 3.

Of the condition of Mankind in the Patriarchal state after the dispersion.

UNDER the ancient patriarchal government the mere corporeal pleasures seem to have been fully enjoyed. Abraham never wanted a comfortable habitation; he lived sometimes in the city of Arbea, Gen. xxiii. sometimes under tents, Gen. xii. xiii. he had flocks, herds and money in abundance, besides a number of servants and slaves. His nephew, Bathuel, appears to have been sufficiently opulent. So also were the sons and grandsons of Abraham; they were clad by the produce of their flocks, and subsisted partly by agriculture; partly on the cattle they pastured, and frequently on the wild animals they caught in the chase. Their lives were usually extended beyond 100 years, and temperance appears to have secured them uninterrupted health. What their amusements were is not recorded.

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But these advantages were counterballanced by many of their customs. Polygamy they practised without any scruple; and often concubinage, even by the persuasion of their wives. To have children was highly honorable, to have none rendered married women objects of contempt. This misfortune was in some measure remedied by supposititious children, the offspring of the handmaids of their wives, as these children were adopted by them, and deemed to be theirs. Women therefore always sensible to the point of honour, and subjugated by fashion, of their own accord offered concubines to their husbands. The indelicacy of these customs is apparent; matrimony became a brutal commerce, from which all refinement was banished. The jealousy and dissensions of the wives and concubines banished peace and comfort from the patriarchs habitation. The brothers sprung from different mothers, and their respective servants were constantly at variance with each other. In families thus circumstanced, it is plain that the pleasing emotions of joy and gladness were excited much more rarely than those of sadness, anger and vexation; instead of conjugal, filial and fraternal love—jealousy, envy, hatred and discord must have been the prevailing sentiments. Cruelty and oppression of the concubines and their children must have been often practised, of which we have an example in the treatment of Hagar and
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her son Ismael. Hence Jacob, the last of these ancient patriarchs, told Pharaoh that he had led an unhappy life.

Jacob and his family passed into Egypt, where they were soon after enslaved. The contemporary patriarchal families, descendants of *Sem*, (with the exception of those that passed into Arabia,) as those of Lot and Bathuel, were overwhelmed by the neighbouring barbarian states, and incorporated with them. The want of union was a radical defect in the patriarchal families.

A nominal or *mock patriarchal* government still exists in *China*, infinitely more imperfect than the ancient, and consequently productive of much more misery. The ancient patriarchs had no family to attend to but their own, to whose interests they could not be insensible, and to the management of whose concerns they were fully competent. But the pretended patriarch or emperor governs numerous and extensive provinces, containing some millions of families, of which he is the absolute despot, to whose welfare it is impossible his individual inspection should extend. Yet he is considered as the common father of his people, and exercises over them the same authority as the father of a family over his particular household, and is thus placed over all earthly controul. Conformably to this system, the governor of a province is considered as the father of that province, and the head of any office or department is supposed to preside over
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it with the same authority, interest and affection as the father of a family superintends and manages the concerns of private life.*

It is much to be lamented (Mr. Barrow adds) that a system of government so plausible in theory, should be liable to so many abuses in practice, and that this fatherly care and affection in the governors, and filial duty and reverence in the governed, should with much more propriety be expressed by the terms of tyranny, oppression and injustice in the one, and by fear, deceit and disobedience in the other. The executive administration is so faulty, that the man in office generally has it in his power to govern the laws, which makes the measure of good or evil depend greatly on his moral character†. Nay property is more insecure here than elsewhere. The condition of women, who form one half of the human species, and that perhaps the best half, without whom the two extremes of human life, as a French writer well remarks, would be helpless, and the middle of it joyless, is as miserable in China as can be well imagined‡. Fathers sell their daughters for presents§. Polygamy is allowed by the laws. But it is only among the rich that plurality of wives can be found.

* Barrow's Travels in China, p. 359, &c.

† Ibid. 380.

‡ Ibid. 140.

§ Ibid. 145.

found. Every great officer of state has his haram, consisting of 6, 8 or 10 women. Every merchant of Canton has his seraglio. But the poor find one wife fully sufficient for all their wants. Female infants are often exposed. Fathers have it in their power to sell their sons for slaves, and this power is not unfrequently put in force. Women must neither eat at table nor sit in the same room with their husbands. The male children at the age of nine or ten are entirely separated from their sisters. Thus the feelings of fraternal tenderness are nipped in the very bud of dawning sentiment*. Among the poor women are employed in the most servile drudgery, even forced to plough, and are often yoked with an ass.

Hence it is remarked by a judicious anonymous critic, that it is not possible for a people deriving their subsistence from the cultivation of the soil, to be held together by means less favourable to human happiness; and that the Turks, whom we deem barbarians, in every particular which can be regarded as a mark or a result of civilization, are their superiors†. To which Mr. L'Evesque adds that the Chinese are perhaps the most vitious of all nations‡. It is therefore needless to be more particular. It is plain the wretched inhabitants

* Barrow 142.

† Edinb. Review, No. 28, p. 413.

‡ Vol. 7. p. 176.

habitants of this celebrated empire are for the most part completely miserable.

§ 3.

Of the condition of the Bedouins, or wandering Arabs.

THE Arabs settled in cities have lost somewhat of their distinctive national manners; but the Bedouins, who live in tents and in separate tribes, still retain the customs and manners of their earliest ancestors—they are the genuine Arabs. The descendants of Jocktan, Esau, and Ismael formed different families under the guidance and direction of those to whom they owed their existence. As these families multiplied, the younger branches still retained some respect for the elder, which of all the progeny was deemed the nearest to the parent stem. And although the subdivisions became more and more numerous, they still regarded themselves as composing but one body. Such an assemblage of families all sprung from the same stock, formed what we call a *tribe*. Thus the representative of the eldest branch retained somewhat of the primary paternal authority over the tribe to

which he belonged*. Each father of a family governs it with authority almost absolute.—These fathers are called *sheicks*. All sheicks who belong to the same tribe, acknowledge a common chief or grand *sheick*, whose authority is limited by custom†.

The dignity of grand sheick is hereditary in his family, but on his death the inferior sheicks chuse his successor out of his family, without any regard to primogeniture. The sheicks and their subjects are born to the life of shepherds and soldiers. As to corporeal pleasures, only the rich can be said to possess any. The poor live in a state of habitual wretchedness and famine. The food consumed by the greater part of them, does not exceed 6 ounces a day. Meat is reserved for the greatest festivals; a few wealthy sheicks alone can kill young camels. Hence they are plunderers of cultivated lands and robbers on the high roads‡. Polygamy, as far as 4 wives, is permitted by the Mahometan code. But the rich only can avail themselves of this permission; though some marry so many in order to profit by their labour§. But the disagreement of these women renders, as usual, domestic life intolerable.—Hence their husbands separate them under pretence

* 2 Niebur, 17. Dublin, edit.

† Volney's Travels in Syria, 242.

† Ibid. 18.

§ 2 Niebuhr. 213.

pretence of superintending their concerns in distant places*.

They dwell under tents when they can afford to have any ; those who cannot, shelter themselves from the inclemency of the weather, either with a piece of cloth stretched upon poles, or by retiring to the cavities of rocks. The chief article of their furniture is a large straw mat, which serves equally for a seat, a table, and a bed†.

Listening to tales and songs forms their principal amusement ; but as they have no books, their stock is soon exhausted. To elude the *tedium vitæ*, they pass their time in smoking tobacco, or an intoxicating drug called *hasch*‡.

The Bedouins are the most irritable of all men, and their vindictive spirit leads to the most outrageous excesses. Not satisfied with blood of the offender they sacrifice that of all the males of his family§. As they have no courts of judicature to resort to, every family seeks to right itself ; it is true that if the contending parties belong to the same tribe, the Sheick and principal subjects join to reconcile them ; but if they belong to two powerful tribes, war is the consequence ;

M 2

hence

* 1 Niebuhr. 211.

† 2 Niebuhr. 224, 225.

‡ Ibid. 209.

§ 2 Niebuhr, 198.

Hence the greater tribes having ancient quarrels live in an habitual state of hostility.*

Hence I think we may safely infer that the condition of this remnant of the ancient patriarchal state, is far removed from happiness, but on the contrary should rather be deemed miserable, though not in the same degree as the Chinese are.

§ 5.

Of the condition of mankind in the Barbarian state.

BY a barbarian state I understand that in which different families or tribes are united under a chief whose authority, though commonly despotic, is not derived from a common parental right of superintendence, but either on election or conquest, and includes some or other, or all the following defects or essential imperfections,

1^o. That the rights of women are either injured or not sufficiently protected.

2^{do}. That either the life, or the liberty, or the property of men is insecure.

3^o. That

* Ibid. 202. Volney, 245.

3^{io} That laws exist or customs prevail, obviously incompatible with general happiness.

By the epithet *barbarian*, the Greeks originally distinguished only the Carians by reason of their vicious pronunciation of the Greek language. Afterwards they bestowed the same appellation on all who did not use the Greek language, and in process of time, on all who were not of Greek origin.* In modern times it is given to all who do not profess the Christian religion, but principally to the African states bordering on the Mediterranean.

The two most ancient governments of this sort, of which we have any credible testimonies, are the Egyptian, and the Assyrian; they are said to have been nearly contemporary, but as the former was by far the most renowned for the wisdom of its institutions, and is even commonly supposed to have been civilized, I shall here shew that strictly speaking it rather merits the appellation of *barbarian*.

Of the Egyptian Government.

As to the physical wants of the Egyptians, it is certain they were in general amply supplied; agriculture flourished,
pasturage

* Strabo, p. 977.

pasturage was protected, and their habitations were comfortable.

Again, they had regular courts of justice, and distinct properties in land. The lives of men were well protected against each other, and several of their subordinate political institutions were admirable. It was to observe these that the ancient Sages of Greece travelled into Egypt.

But to counterballance these advantages, the government was monarchical, and the monarch despotic, as appears in many instances. The father of Sesostris, it is said, caused all the male infants born the same day with his son to be brought to court. Cheops, another of their sovereigns, shut up all the temples, and forbid all to offer sacrifices, and yet the priests formed the most powerful class in Egypt. Nay, he compelled his subjects to build the principal Pyramid. His successor, Chephron was equally tyrannical, and oppressed his subjects by every possible means.*

Again, the rights of women were essentially injured; they were often forcibly torn from their families, and if married, their husbands put to death, a fate which Abraham dreaded. Polygamy, without any limitation, was permitted.† Their wives were so strictly confined, that they were not permitted

* Herodot. Lib. 2. Chap. 24 and 27.

† Diodor. Lib. 1. p. 91. folio Wessck Edit.

mitted to wear shoes, and yet could not appear in public without them.

Though the lives of the subjects were well guarded against each other, yet they were not against superstition, for if any of them happened to kill a cat, or any other of their sacred animals, though inadvertently and by chance, he was irremissably put to death.*

Men were prohibited from following any other profession but that of their fathers. Those who followed any mechanical trade or profession were held in contempt.†

Thieving was not only authorized by law, but even encouraged by rewards.‡

It is said, nevertheless, that the population of Egypt was very considerable, and thence it is inferred that the state of the inhabitants was happy. Yet I think this an insufficient proof of general happiness, for wherever food can easily be procured, the population will be considerable, though in many respects miserable. Goguet shews the population of Egypt was excessively exaggerated.||

Several sciences, it is true, might, comparatively with other nations, be said to have flourished in Egypt, but they were

* Diodor. Lib. 1. p. 94.

† Diodor. Lib. 1. p. 190.

‡ Herod. Lib. 2. cap. 167.

|| Vol. 2. p. 11.

were cultivated only by the sacerdotal order to which they were confined, and it does not appear that they were ever advanced beyond the rude state in which they existed before the dispersion, in the plains of Shinaar. The multitudes who flocked to Egypt were forced to unite into one social body sooner than the tribes that took another direction, from the necessity of jointly co-operating in draining the country. The various operations were conducted under the direction of the most knowing, who also attended to religious concerns.

Hence I think we may infer that the Egyptian government was at least *semi-barbarian*, and the condition of the inhabitants was, upon the whole, miserable; a certain proof of which is their easy conquest both by the Ethiopians, the Babylonians and the Persians; and the feeble efforts they made to free themselves from these foreigners.

Of the Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian Empires.

I mention these three empires collectively, as they seem to be barely three different successions of the same species of government and their institutions nearly the same; only a few particulars, however, have been transmitted to us by ancient historians.

In

In each, the government was monarchical, and the monarchy hereditary. They had written laws, and justice seems to have been duly administered. Acts of violence were severely punished.

The sciences were assiduously cultivated, particularly astronomy, by the Chaldeans and Babylonians, and the arts seem to have reached a high degree of perfection.

These are the most favourable sources of public happiness that occur in their histories.

But on the other hand their monarchs were despotic, and their despotism was often carried to the most extravagant excesses; one of them set up a golden statue, which he commanded all nations to adore under the severest penalty.* Another enacted that no God should be prayed to for thirty days but himself.†

Yet, notwithstanding the plenitude of their power, they could not repeal their own decrees; probably to prevent remonstrances and petitions.

Polygamy was permitted. Concubinage to an unlimited extent universally practised, and the male sex essentially injured; thus the rights of both sexes were violated.‡

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Professions,

* Daniel, chap. 3.

† Ibid. chap. 6.

‡ The first Darius had two wives.

Professions, at least among the Assyrians, were hereditary ; children were not permitted to quit their father's occupation and embrace another.*

These governments must therefore be annexed to the *semi-barbarian* class ; but I think they approached nearer to the civilized state than the *Egyptian*, the evils of despotism being less felt in dominions of such great extent than within the narrow bounds of Egypt, nor were their subjects oppressed by that odious and stupid superstition under which Egypt was rendered wretched and contemptible.

Of the Grecian Governments.

Of these I shall mention only the two which are most celebrated and best known to us, the Lacedemonian and the Athenian.

Of the Lacedemonian Government.

The Spartan government (so called because residing in Sparta) has been amply described by many ancients, and praised infinitely beyond its merits by most writers both an-
cien-

* Diodor. Lib. 2. p. 142.

cient and modern, for reasons well set forth by Monsieur L'Evesque.*

Its authority was distributed betwixt four different bodies. Two kings conjointly reigning, a senate, five Ephori (a sort of tribunes of the people) and the assembly of the people ; but at last the whole power centered in the Ephori.

There were originally two factions in Sparta ; after violent dissensions, one proved victorious, and engrossed the sovereignty ; it consisted of 9 or 10,000 persons, to which the other, consisting of 30,000, was subjected. This class was called *free*, although in reality enslaved. The number of those that groaned under the yoke of the first or governing class was increased by the inhabitants of the city of *Helos*, who were reduced to the most abject servitude. Even those of the second class who were denominated not slaves, but *subjects*, might be put to death at the caprice of the Ephori, without examination of their guilt. The best lands were seized by the first class, and the poorest given to the second, and were scarcely sufficient for their support.

The Helotes were compelled to labour for both these classes ; their masters were forbidden to grant them their liberty ; nay, they received a certain number of lashes every year, with a view of keeping them in mind of their obedience ; if any of them

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was

*Third Vol. of the Institute, p. 347.

was remarkable for his shape or beauty, he was put to death ; and farther, from time to time, the youth of Sparta were ordered to lie in ambush for them, and slaughter them at night, to prevent their growing too numerous.*

Every year a feast was celebrated in honour of Diana. Then all the children of Sparta were whipped until the blood ran down the altars of the Goddess.

With regard to their domestic concerns, they were regulated by the severest restrictions ; no one had a right to adjust his mode of living by his own will ; a fat man was punished for being so.

Many other instances might be adduced in proof of the miserable condition even of the governing class, they are enumerated by Goguet and L'Evesque, but I think those I mentioned abundantly sufficient to prove that under the Spartan government, men were reduced to the most miserable condition the world ever beheld either before or since.

Of the Athenian Government.

The subjects of this state consisted of four distinct classes. 1st Free citizens.—2^{dly}, Sojourners.—3^{dly}, Free servants.—4^{thly} Slaves. The first class consisted of about 30, or 36,000 ; the other classes of nearly 400,000, of which slaves formed by far the greater number.

The

* 3 Goguet, 214, &c.

The legislative power was vested in the class of free citizens assembled, though no more than 6000 usually met, without any regard to property. Though this assembly could alone make or repeal any law, yet by the constitution this exorbitant power was in some measure restricted by a chosen senate, in whom a right of precognition was vested. The assembly had also the right of judging all causes on appeals to it, but after some time every power was absorbed by the general assembly of the citizens, ever giddy, capricious, factious, and frequently unjust.

This was accounted a *free* government, yet surely very improperly. No government can be accounted *free*, whose freedom is not sufficiently secured, which was far from being the case at Athens, where the most uncontrouled despotism was vested in a multitude, the majority of which was equally ignorant, capricious, insolent and improvident.

There were also many subordinate courts of justice, with various functions, particularly the Areopagus, whose decisions were generally equitable.

The physical wants of the inhabitants of Attica seem to have been sufficiently provided for. Commerce flourished, various arts and manufactures were practised, and a great degree of luxury prevailed. Consequently agriculture was successfully promoted, nor do they seem to have been deficient in commodious habitations.

Crimes

Crimes manifestly injurious to society, were rigorously punished.

The rights of women were tolerably well secured ; polygamy strictly forbidden ; any violence offered them was punishable by heavy fines. Wives brought scarce any fortune to their husbands, and if ill treated, might obtain a divorce. Adultery was severely punished.

These advantages however were fully counterbalanced by the tyranny of the governing democracy, and several outrageous and criminal practices either permitted or licensed by the laws. Opposite factions, headed by eloquent demagogues, kept the city in a constant ferment. Every restraint on the caprice of the multitude they gradually removed. They usurped the judicial power in the first instance, and many persons of the most signal virtue were unjustly condemned to death. All were liable to banishment without being accused of any crime by the decree of Ostracism. Nay those who chiefly suffered by it were those who being most eminent for reputation, riches, eloquence, or even virtuous and glorious actions, excited the envy of the people.

Inhabitants of foreign extraction, who formed a considerable portion of the population, were subjected to a distinct tribute, and incapable of any employment, and were not allowed to transact any business in their own name ; thus they existed in the state merely by connivance.

Slaves

Slaves, who together with free servants, formed the most numerous part of the inhabitants of Attica were wholly at the discretion of their masters, and might in most places be starved, beaten and tormented, without any appeal to superior power;—they were not permitted to plead for themselves, nor be witnesses in any case; yet it was customary to extort confessions from them by torture; they were stigmatized on the forehead with a red hot iron. However it is certain that for undeserved ill usage they had some redress, either by taking refuge in the temple of Theseus, or by a suit at law; but how miserable the condition of those, who from their distance from that temple, or otherwise, could do neither!

Farther, women were confined to their houses; were not permitted to appear at public entertainments. Concubinage was universally practised, and even unnatural crimes were not interdicted.

Thus we see that the condition of every class of the inhabitants of Attica, was upon the whole miserable; and that the Athenian commonwealth can at most be deemed only *semi-civilized*.

Of the Roman Empire.

THE authority of the Roman emperors being entirely despotic, the happiness of their subjects depended on the temper and disposition of the reigning monarch, and frequently on his superstition. Of the character of these emperors we have a more detailed account than of any of the ancient Asiatic monarchs: in perusing their history it will be found, that those periods during which the condition of their subjects approached nearest to happiness, were, in the space of 500 years, by far the shortest, scarcely exceeding 100 years, and succeeding each other at distant intervals; namely, during the reigns of Augustus, Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Adrian and the two Antonines.

However, for several years after the commencement of this empire, and even under the most cruel emperors, the greater number of those who either by birth or otherwise had obtained the privileges of Roman citizens, enjoyed the advantage of being governed by the Roman laws, the most equitable ever known; by which their lives, liberties and properties were secured against all but the supreme despot himself. Even the conquered provinces were more humanely treated than under the republican government.

Again,

Again, the Western provinces of the Empire, as Gaul, Spain, Britain, Pannonia, Illyricum, &c. were drawn from a state nearly savage, in which they were engaged in almost continual hostilities with each other, to a more peaceful and nearly a civilized state; taught various arts and a common language. Even the Eastern provinces were much happier than under their native tyrannic despots. And what chiefly contributed to the happiness of both the Eastern and Western provinces, the christian religion was announced to, and received by them; which amended their lives, humanized their manners, extended their views beyond the present life, and enabled them to bear its evils with patience and resignation.

These advantages were not however possessed without a considerable alloy of various evils; partly arising from the civil constitution of the government, and partly from the intolerant bigotry of the emperors, both Heathen and Christian, and partly from their imbecility. Evils which gradually increased and preponderated to such a degree, as finally to destroy the imperial government, and produce a mass of misery hitherto unparalleled. But to be more particular, these evils were derived, 1^o from the invidious distinction that prevailed in the conquered provinces, betwixt the native freemen of these provinces, and those that possessed the rights of Roman citizens; much discontent was naturally engendered, as well as frequent irremediable distress and op-

pression of the former class, though by far the most numerous. This evil was co-extensive with the empire ; however it lasted little more than 200 years, during which imperial cruelty was exercised only in the capital.

2dly, from the inhuman treatment of slaves, who though forming a numerous part of the population, were, until the reigns of Adrian and the Antonines, left wholly to the discretion of their masters, and could not claim the protection of the laws.

3dly, from the rapacity of the governors of the more distant provinces.

4thly, From the religious persecutions, whether of christians by the heathen emperors, or of different christian sects by each other, each claiming the exclusive possession of divine knowledge, and rejecting every other as impious. By this whole provinces were depopulated ; the inhabitants flying for protection to the enemies of the empire.

5thly, From the civil wars of the various pretenders to the imperial dignity ; for there being no settled rule of succession after the extinction of the Julian family, the different armies claimed the right of conferring the empire on their respective commanders ; the outrages accompanying and succeeding these wars, may well be imagined.

6thly, From the sudden but wide-spreading incursions of the Northern barbarians who ravaged with impunity extensive

sive provinces, and massacred or made captives of the inhabitants.

7thly, From the imbecility of Honorius, who either put to death his ablest generals, or drove them into rebellion; and thus laid open the principal provinces of the empire to various barbarian nations, by whom they were successively ravaged, and finally subdued.

8thly, From the enormous weight of the taxes, which multiplied with the public distress. Severe inquisitions, which confiscated their goods and tortured their persons, compelled the subjects of Valentinian the 3d to fly to woods and mountains, and to prefer the more simple tyranny of the barbarians.

9thly, On the division and decline of the empire, the tributary harvests of Egypt and Africa were withdrawn. Italy was exhausted of inhabitants by war, famine and pestilence.

Hence Dr. Robertson remarks, that, “if a man were called to fix upon a period in the history of the world, during which the condition of the human race was most calamitous and afflicted, he would without hesitation name that which elapsed from the death of Theodosius an. 395, to the establishment of the Lombards in Italy, an. 571*.

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Of

* Life of Charles the 5th, vol. 1. p. 11.—there, and in Gibbon's history of the Decline of the Roman Empire, the proof of all the above particulars may be found.

Of the Barbarian Governments in Europe.

THE governments founded on the ruins of the Roman empire, namely, in Italy, Gaul, Spain and Britain, present many points of view favourable to the happiness of the inhabitants; of these I shall briefly point out the most conspicuous.

1st, Their firm attachment to a given family, to some member of which the executive and judicial, and in some degree also the legislative powers of the state were confided, and the regal dignity conferred: thus the confusion of elections, and the violent attempts of usurpers were prevented. This rule was never violated, except where the regal family, by reason of its imbecility, became incapable of exercising the regal functions, and not often even then.

2dly, That the regal power was constitutionally limited by general assemblies, at first of all the freemen and clergy of the state, and afterwards by those of the principal inhabitants and the bishops. Thus tyranny was checked, many wholesome laws enacted, perverse customs eradicated, and a due regard for learning was introduced among an illiterate people.

3dly, Principles

3dly, Principles of liberty were universally diffused, which were either extinguished or unknown during the existence of the Roman government, the courts of justice were so well modelled, that their decrees were commonly conformable to their laws and customs.

4thly. The rights of women and the care of orphans were specially attended to.

5thly. Their veneration for the clergy was such, that amidst all their intestine wars after their conversion to Christianity, monasteries and ecclesiastical lands were generally respected. To this respect we owe the preservation of all the classics and other ancient writers that we now possess.

6thly. By the institution of chivalry in the 11th century, a high sense of fidelity, honour and a spirit of gallantry were introduced, by which the rustic manners of the preceding ages were gradually refined and polished.

Favourable, however, as these circumstances were to human happiness, these governments contained numerous obstructions to its perfect attainment.

1st. A marked partiality was manifested for some centuries in favour of the Barbarian conquerors and their descendants, injurious and disgraceful to the ancient inhabitants and their posterity; most crimes were punished by pecuniary mulcts, but those inflicted on the latter were double those inflicted on the former.

2dly. The

2dly. The compensations for homicide, theft, robbery, &c. were easy to the rich, but grievous to the poor.

3dly. Slaves, who in every state formed the most numerous class, were left to the absolute dominion of their masters, who might punish them capitally, without the intervention of any judge.

4thly. Agriculture, commerce, trades and sciences were held in contempt, at least for many ages. No professions were honoured with the public esteem, but the military and the clerical.

5thly, Kings were permitted to divide and partition their dominions between their sons, who invariably after their father's decease made war on each other, and thus spread ruin and devastation throughout their territories.

6thly. The barons, among whom each kingdom was subsequently divided, claimed and exercised the right of committing hostilities on each other, and even on their common sovereign, at their own discretion, these hostilities were numerous and frequent, and consisting chiefly in mutual ravages, burning the houses of the unfortunate inhabitants, carrying off their cattle, and destroying the fruits of the earth, a general famine and its attendant miseries commonly ensued.

7thly. During many ages superstition also shed its baneful influence. Many were burned for the imaginary crime of witchcraft ;

witchcraft ; many for holding opinions deemed heretical. To exterminate these and Paganism, armies have been collected and whole provinces depopulated.

In a word, such was the situation of Europe from the fall of the Roman empire till about the opening of the eleventh century, that to use the words of a profound antiquarian, “ we shall probably not be able to discover a period of its “ history, in which there is to be found greater licence, less “ order, and consequently less happiness.”* He adds, that we must not suppose, that these disorders ceased after this period, but they were gradually diminished after a lapse of some centuries.†

8thly. To repress these disorders, and partly for ambitious purposes standing armies have for some centuries past been maintained by most European sovereigns. Through them their power at present knows no limits but those which decency and the spirit of the times prescribe. A victorious despot may set even these aside, and trample with impunity not only on the laws of his country, but on those of nature and nations.

Of

* Ward's Enquiry into the foundation and history of the Laws of Nations in Europe. Vol. 1. p. 136.

† Ibid. p. 241.

Of the Polish and Russian Governments.

Neither Poland nor Russia were ever conquered by the Romans ; yet the Polish government was for some centuries the most imperfect in Europe, and the great mass of its inhabitants the most unhappy, from the turbulence and tyranny of the nobility, and the too limited prerogative of the nominal sovereign.

Citizens and tradesmen were held in contempt, and the peasants in slavery. The killing a peasant by a nobleman was atoned for by the payment of fifteen shillings.*

The power of the *Russian* monarch is the most despotic in Christian Europe, and his territories the most extensive. The persons, goods and even lives of his subjects are wholly at his disposal. The nobility have no privilege, not even that of precedence, the peasants are in the same condition as those of Poland.† Punishments were shockingly inhuman untill moderated by a happy succession of female sovereigns. Russia enjoyed unparalleled glory and happiness under the reign of *Catherine the admirable*, the most accomplished sovereign

* Totze, *State of Europe*, 270.

† Ibid. 353, 354, 2 Cox, 324.

sovereign the world was blessed with since the reign of Titus.*

Of the Gentoo or Hindou government.

That portion of Asia improperly called the Indian peninsula contains many powerful kingdoms, and its ancient inhabitants *Gentoos* or *Hindous*. I shall mention only such laws, customs or usages as are common to all or most of them.

1st. The government is monarchical, and hereditary at least in the same family.

2dly. The inhabitants are divided into four distinct classes.

1^o the *Bramins*, who form the learned and sacerdotal class.

2^{do}. The *Cheteries*, who form the military and governing class.

3^{io}. The *Bice* of which are the agriculturists and merchants.

And 4^o. The *Sooder*, which consists of servants and labourers.

This distinction which is founded on their religion, is so rigorously observed that scarce any intercourse is permitted between them. Those of a superior class will not eat or drink with those of an inferior, nor suffer themselves to

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be

* Yet the most falsely and basely calumniated. I would not disgrace her by the name of *the Great*—a title by which the most successful destroyers of human happiness have been hitherto distinguished.

be touched by them. A Bramin will not condescend to eat even with his sovereign. Women are not allowed to marry a man of an inferior class, nor men to marry women of a superior, under pain of death. Nay, if a man of an inferior class has had any illicit commerce with a lady of a superior, he not only is punished with death, but the nearest relations of the lady are allowed for three days to kill all such relatives of the criminal as they shall meet in the district where the fact was committed.*

Polygamy is practised, but one wife is acknowledged as supreme ; if she be the wife of a Bramin she incurs disgrace if she does not consent to be burned in case she survives him.

Their political institutions must, as Mr. Pinkerton remarks, be originally bad, as the great mass of the people are oppressed by one or two privileged casts, whence, the dispirited natives were conquered by every invader,† and Dr. Buchanan, who long resided in India, tells us ‡ “ that no
“ useful science has been diffused by the Bramins among
“ their followers ; history they have totally abolished, mora-
“ lity they have depressed to the utmost ; even the laws at-
“ tributed to *Menu*, under the hands of the Bramins have
become

* Dillon, 97. 6 Mod. Univ. History, 63 8vo.

† Pinkerton's Geography, Vol. 2. p. 248.

‡ 6 Asiatic Researches, 166.

“ become the most abominable and degrading system of
 “ oppression ever invented by the craft of designing men.”

“ Passive millions drag a feeble existence under the iron
 “ rod of a few crafty casts amidst a climate and a soil al-
 “ most paradisiacal, and where it seemed impossible for
 “ human malignity to have introduced general degradation
 “ and distress.”*

From the immense population of this country, many may still infer that its inhabitants enjoy no small share of happiness, yet in addition to what I have observed on this head, in treating of the Egyptian government, the vicinity of Vesuvius, notwithstanding its frequent eruptions is as populous as any other part of the Neapolitan kingdom.

Of the Mahometan Governments.

These extend over a great part of the old world, and are every where so cruel, harsh and hostile to human happiness, that the epithet *Barbarian* has by all Christian nations been exclusively applied to them. I shall notice only two, the Turkish and the Persian as the Mogul and African governments differ from them only in a few particulars. That of Egypt is rather a cruel anarchy.

P 2

Of

* Pinkerton's Geography, Vol. 2. p. 248.

Of the Turkish Government.

The sovereignty of the Turkish empire rests exclusively in the Ottoman family, but within that family the choice of the successor depends chiefly on the reigning Sultan, and frequently on the Janissaries, by whom the Sultan is often deposed and put to death. Hence he confines or massacres his brethren.

The power of the Sultan is in some respects despotic, and in others limited. It is limited, 1st. By the Rules of the Koran. 2ly. By the *Ulema*, or body of the lawyers or interpreters of the Mahometan law, at the head of whom is the *Mufti* the High Priest, without whose consent no political act can be undertaken ; but the *Mufti* is nominated, and may be deposed by the Sultan. 3dly. By the *great council*, consisting of the great military officers, and the heads of the *Ulema* ; no important act of government can be undertaken without a previous discussion in this assembly.* In the regular administration however, the Sultan is possessed of the most arbitrary power over the lives of his subjects without process or formality. With regard to property

* Eaton's Survey, Chap. 1. See also Porter's Observations on Turkey.

perty, he is the lawful heir of all his officers; and as to other subjects, he may first put them to death under various pretexts, and then seize their properties. Hence in Turkey neither life nor property are secure.

Polygamy, as far as 4 wives, is allowed, but the number of concubines is unlimited.

A cruel and oppressive distinction is established betwixt the Mahometan and Christian inhabitants; these, though said to form two-thirds of the whole number, yet through the excess of Mahometan bigotry and intolerance, they are reduced nearly to a state of slavery.

There are courts of justice indeed in Turkey, but justice is notoriously venal.

Of the Persian Government.

This government is still more despotic than the Turkish: at least its despotism receives fewer obstructions, and scarcely maintains the appearance of justice.* Its ancient regal families are extinct, and hence Persia is continually ravaged by contending claimants.

Polygamy obtains here as in Turkey.

Intolerance

* 2 Decouverte's Russes, 272.

Intolerance is milder here than in Turkey, though it is in some respects greater. A Persian will not eat with a person of a different religion; nor drink out of the same cup with a Christian, a Jew, or even an Indian.* Judges are still more corrupt here than in Turkey, for they take bribes from both the contending parties.†

Hence it is not in this country that we can seek for security either for life or property; consequently the government must be deemed *semi-barbarian*; though in politeness even to strangers, the Persians exceed every other Asiatic nation, but their politeness is interested.‡

Luxury of every kind is carried to a great excess, both in buildings, number of domestics, dress, and mode of living.§

Of the Condition of Mankind in the Savage State.

By the *savage state* I understand that in which different families exist without any other connexion with each other, but a common language and habitation in the same territory; uncontrouled by any laws but those of nature, having no chief invested

* Olivier Voyage en Egypte & en Perse, vol. 5. 253.

Ibid. p. 256. & 258.

† 2 Decour. 276.

§ 5 Olivier, 258.

invested with coercive authority, except when engaged in hostilities, having no tribunals to decide their differences, implacable in their vengeance, treating their enemies with extreme cruelty; polygamists, yet without any restrictive matrimonial contracts, holding their females in a state of slavery, (though this abuse is not without some singular exceptions) possessing no arts but the rudest and grossest, having no property but in things absolutely necessary for their existence.

These are the distinctive characters of the savage state; most savages it is true live either by fishing or hunting, or both; but no lawful mode of life affords a sufficient reason for denominating any portion of mankind *savage*; for even civilized tribes might subsist in that manner.

The savage state seems to have existed in the remotest ages; it appears to have originated principally from the ancient mode of punishing criminals. Notwithstanding the Noachic institution that homicide should be punished with death, criminals frequently escaped that punishment by flight, as was the custom in Greece.* Involuntary homicide was always so punished,† and consequently crimes of inferior magnitude; hence Euripides says,

Quam

* Diodor. Lib. 4. cap. 5.

† 2 Goguet. 73.

Quam bene parentum provida ætas statuerat
 Ut cageretur de via decedere.
 Hominumque visu, cæde patrata, nocens ;
 Fugaque lueret triste. non letho, Scelus.

GROTIUS:

Many instances of this custom occur in Homer.

During the interval of 531 years betwixt the deluge and the dispersion, and many subsequent ages, various criminals followed by their families must have been from time to time driven to countries far distant from the parent state. There, ignorant of all arts, destitute of tools, and furnished only with bows and arrows and fishing tackling, they fell into that miserable unconnected lawless state which we call *savage*. In a course of ages their original language was corrupted or lost. Different nations or tribes arose from a succession of such outlaws from different countries, or perhaps from the same.

This I believe to have been the cause generally productive of this mode of life ; but it probably often originated also from various accidents, as shipwrecks on desert countries, expulsion by a conquering nation, &c.

That savage nations or tribes existed in the most ancient ages, we have many authentic testimonies. Pomponius Mela, treating of the nations in the interior of Africa, says,* *Sequuntur vagi pecora.—Quanquam in familias passim & sine lege dispersi, nihil in commune consultant.* And Sallust, *De Bello*

* Lib. 1. cap. 8.

Bello Jugurthino,* says, *Africam, initio habuere Getuli & Libyes, Asperi incultique—hi neque moribus, neque lege aut imperio cujusquam regebantur; vagi, palantes, quas nox coegerat sedes habebant.*—Nay, the ancient inhabitants of Italy, Salust tells us were savages,† for he calls them, *Genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio liberum atque solutum.*

Such savages exist even at this day in Asia, America, Africa and Europe. The principal circumstances that regard the most remarkable of these I shall briefly mention, and shew, that though most, if not all of these are, through God's benignant providence, content and satisfied with their desolate state, yet that it cannot be denominated *happy*, much less the *happiest*, is an undertaking that might well be thought superfluous, if not ridiculous, if the contrary had not been maintained by the most powerful and imposing orator that perhaps ever existed.‡ His paradox I shall, in the sequel minutely consider.

Before I proceed further I feel it necessary to remove a mistake that has generally prevailed, in considering the condition of savages; it consists in confounding content with happiness; and as many savage tribes are content with their situation, it is inferred that they are happy. In what that

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happiness

* Cap. 18.

† De Bello Catalin. Cap. 6.

‡ Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his treatise, Sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes.

happiness consists which may be enjoyed in the present life, I have already shewn. Content does not imply so much ; it requires not the excess of pleasing perceptions over the displeasing, but merely the absence of intense pain, whether corporeal or mental, and consequently of the fruitless desire of change to a more comfortable state. Desire includes some knowledge of the object desired, but the savage knows no other comforts but those he enjoys, and if by any chance he discovers them, he finds himself incapable of receiving them,* he is satisfied with mere existence and possessing the means of maintaining it, however disgusting and nauseous they may be. Of pleasurable perceptions he is acquainted with none but the grossest.

The content of many in the lowest classes of civilized society stands on a much better footing. Their food may be simple but not nauseous, and it may be secured without any dangerous or even painful exertions ; their habitations are sufficient to guard them from the inclemency of the seasons, and free from the offensive smells that are found in the dens or caverns of savages ; their cloathing coarse and homely, but not frowzy nor verminous as that of savages always is. To most mental pleasures they have free access, and if they are wise, their desires extend no farther than their power of lawful gratifications.†

Of

* See the proof of this No. 15.

† See this subject well handled in Gilpin's Dialogues.

Of the Asiatic Savages.

Of these the fullest account is given by Mr. L'Evesque in the 6th vol. of his History of Russia. He collected it in Petersburg and Moscow from the journals of various travellers and navigators. These savage tribes are very numerous, but I shall confine myself to a description of only six of them, as these will afford a sufficient idea of savage life. These are, 1st. The inhabitants of the *Alouetian* islands, seated on the north eastern extremity of Asia and neighbouring on America. 2dly. The *Kampschatdales*, nearly at the N. E. extremity of the continent of Asia. 3dly. The *Koriacks*. 4thly. the *Tchoutkchi*. 5thly. The *Samoieds*. 6thly. the *Toungousi*.

The Alouetians.

The Alouetians have *no government of any kind*, yet each community elects some chief, invested with no other authority but that of deciding any dispute they may have with each other. They generally chuse the man that has the largest family, and is most successful in hunting or fishing;

when at war he is their leader, and his authority is then more absolute.

Their *food* is generally fish, frequently half putrified and cast on shore, and the flesh of foxes and birds of prey, which they devour raw. Though at their festivals they boil it, and serve it up as a dainty. They eat also some wild roots and sea weed.

Their *cloathing* the skins of sea calves, of foxes and of birds.

Their *habitation* a ditch 9 feet deep, 18 in breadth, and from 30 to 300 in length; the sides supported by posts, and covered by a frame, on which earth and grass are laid, with apertures to serve for doors, with a ladder fixed to each, and others to admit air and light, and some to let out smoke when they happen to have fires, which they seldom have, for even without any, the heat is insupportable, and the smell from putrifying fish horrible. From 50 to 500 persons inhabit the same ditch. Each habitation has a separate property annexed to it on the opposite shore. All the fish and shells found on it, and maritime plants, exclusively belong to the owner of the habitation.

Their marriages (if they can be called so) last only during pleasure, no previous consent of parents, no contracts, nor portion, nor festivity are required, and polygamy constantly practised.

practised. They frequently exchange their wives with each other.

Their *disposition* is brutal; they endeavour to surprize their enemies, and if they succeed, they exterminate them. Parents pay no attention to their adult children, who quit them when they chose.

They occupy the lowest place in the scale of savage life.

The Kamptschatdales.

While at peace they are *perfectly independent*, and have chiefs whom they obey when at war, and whom, if victorious, they continue to respect.

Their *food*, the flesh of bears or other quadrupeds, or fish smoaked and dried; the heads of fish half putrified and reduced to a pap is their greatest delicacy. They never wash the vessels in which they prepare or eat their food.

Their *cloathing*, the skins of Rhen-deer, which they purchase from the Koriacks, or even of sea calves or birds.

Their *habitations*, separate ditches four feet deep, whose dimensions are proportioned to the number of persons in each family. In the midst of which four posts are fixed at the distance of about seven feet from each other. These are traversed by joices to which others are fastened, which reach
to

to the ground, and the whole covered with moss and clay mixed together. In this covering two apertures are left, one to serve as a common door, a chimney and a window, and another to serve as a door for the women. To each door a sort of ladder is annexed; that belonging to the common door being placed close to the fire, when there is any, becomes so hot as to be scarce tolerable, to say nothing of the cloud of smoke through which one must ascend or descend. Their summer habitations are built on the surface of the earth, and somewhat less inconvenient. Each community claims a property in the banks of the river opposite to their habitation.

Women are here highly respected, even after they become wives. Hence polygamy, though permitted, is rarely practised. Their courtships and marriages are accompanied with some festivities and ridiculous ceremonies. Divorces are common. Children are never checked or reprimanded.

Their *disposition* is cruel; they endeavour to surprise their enemies; the most valiant of their prisoners they put to death with the most exquisite torments. Others they reduce to slavery.

The

The Koriacks.

Of these, some tribes have fixed habitations, others rove through extensive deserts. None have any chiefs; homicide is punished, and with great cruelty by the relations of the deceased.

The wandering tribes lead a pastoral life, and support themselves by the products of their herds of Rhen-deer; the sedentary are hunters, and live on the products of the chase.

Their *cloathing* is the same as that of the Kampschatdales.

The *habitations* of the sedentary, resemble also that of the Kampschatdales. Those of the wandering tribes are formed of posts fixed in the earth and covered with the skins of Rhen-deer, with an opening at top to let out smoke and let in light.

The *wives* of the pastors are reduced to the most abject servitude; they are polygamists, and as they divide their herds, they oblige one of their wives to superintend each one division. They may even kill them with impunity. The sedentary are less jealous, and even offer their wives and daughters to strangers.

Yet these pastors think themselves the *happiest* of men, and that strangers come among them only to eat of the
flesh

flesh of their Rhen-deer. They are of a choleric, cruel and vindictive temper, and make war on their neighbours, though unprovoked by any injury received from them. Those that possess the most numerous herds are most respected.

Of the Tchouktchi.

These are both pastors and hunters, and at times fishers. They have no chiefs; their *habitations* are similar to those of the Kamptschatdales, but more extensive. They also construct others loftier, as the Kamptschatdales, and sometimes they lodge in the caverns of rocks.

They *cloath* themselves as the former.

Their food is fish or flesh, but through avarice they eat only such tame Rhen-deer as die a natural death. They sometimes intoxicate themselves by an infusion of a root called *Moukamore*.

They are hospitable to an excess, for they offer their *wives* to strangers.

Their ferocity exceeds that of the Koriacks, they are constantly at war with their neighbours, whose Rhen-deer they carry off.

Of

Of the Samoiedes.

They inhabit the borders of the frozen ocean from the Mezen in Europe, to the Lena in Asia. They have no chiefs or government of any kind. They abhor homicide, and commit no crimes.

Their *food* consists of the animals whom they hunt, and eat raw, and sometimes a dead whale: some have herds of Rhen-deer. They procure intoxication of late by smoaking tobacco, and sometimes by whiskey they procure from the Russians.

Their *raiment*—the skins of Rhen-deer or foxes.

Their *habitation*—huts half sunk in the ground, over which some posts are placed covered with the skins of Rhen-deer, with an aperture to admit light and let out the smoak. Their summer habitation is laid on the surface of the earth, and similarly constructed.

Their *females* are treated with the most unaccountable cruelty and contempt. They are considered as polluted, and are not suffered to approach the fire, which is regarded as sacred. They are not allowed in travelling to tread in the track of their tyrants, nor even of his Rhen-deer; any thing they touch must be purified; yet they are bought by their husbands, who even affect to be jealous of them: and what

is equally extraordinary, they are often mothers at the age of 12 or 13, and feel no pain in parturition.

In other respects their disposition is mild, nay timid; the least noise frightens them. Miserable as their condition is, they prefer it to all the conveniencies of civilized life, which some of them saw at Moscow. They viewed them without curiosity, and with a stupid indifference; they regretted their deserts, and hastened to return to them.

The Tougousi.

The Tougousi inhabit much milder climates than the savages above mentioned; when at war they elect chiefs to command them; they respect the descendants of their ancient chiefs, from among whom they elect their commanders, unless they find some one else of distinguished merit. They delight to wander from place to place, and *subsist* in winter by hunting, and in summer by fishing, and some by pasturage. These last have often 1000 Rhen-deer, and the more Southern possess horses, sheep, goats and camels.

Their *cloaths* and *habitations* are much the same as those already mentioned; but they are strangers to intoxication. They never eat their meat raw, but rather boil or roast it.

Polygamy

Polygamy is allowed; some have five wives, but most only one, whom they quit when they please. Their marriages are attended with no ceremonies, but however with some festivities. They purchase their wives from their fathers, and never ill treat them, even when guilty of *adultery*. Seduction is grievously punished.

Their *disposition* is vindictive, but they are sensible to the point of honour; if grievously offended they challenge the offender to single combat. Assassination they scorn. Their duels are accompanied with some ceremonies as formerly in Europe. Lighter injuries they terminate by reference to arbitrators—generally their chiefs.

They seem to form the link that unites the savage with the barbarian state.

All savages are distinguishable by a total inattention to cleanliness.

Of the American Savages.

The peculiarities of the different tribes of American savages have not been described with that minuteness and precision with which Mr. *L'Evesque* has delineated those of the Asiatic savages. The missionary, *La Fitau*, who lived several

ral years among those on the borders of Canada, has indeed given an account of their various customs and manners, in two quarto volumes, but intermixed with dissertations so foreign to the subject he undertook to treat of, as to render his work a chaos, from which scarce any precise notion can be extracted. Dr. *Robertson*, in his history of America, abounds indeed in just philosophic reflections on savage life; but they are rather the results of various observations, than specific accounts of any particular tribes; which he thought would lead to details of tiresome extent. Moreover, he constantly confounds the savage and barbarian states: however, it is him I am in general obliged to follow. Some important particulars I have also extracted from Hearne's Journey to the Northern Ocean.

The American savage tribes are divided into small *independent* communities, scattered over regions of vast extent, and in a state of constant hostility and rivalry. The forest or hunting grounds are deemed the *property* of the tribe, from which it has a title to exclude every rival nation. When they go to war, or to hunt, the leader of the most approved courage and skill takes the lead; but during seasons of tranquillity and inaction, all pre-eminence ceases.—Roberts. 90, 93. Volney's View, 397. Such he tells us was the form of political order established among the greater part of the American nations, Eastward of the Mississippi, from the mouth of the
the

the St. Laurence, lat. 50° to the confines of Florida, lat. 30° but he does not mention that singular *Guinocracy*, or female government, that, according to La Fitau, 463, existed amongst the *Iroquois* and the *Hurons*, among whom the men are only the deputies of the women. I suppose he did not credit it: yet as to the *Hurons*, it is confirmed by *Masson Morvilliers*. Encyclopedie selon l'ordre des Matieres. *Hurons*. Yet they inhabit a country as cold as *Canada*.

If violence is committed, the community does not interfere; it belongs to the family injured, or of whom any member was slain, to avenge the wrong, or accept reparation, 2 Roberts. 95.

But, south of latitude 30. the power of those vested with authority, gradually increases. In Florida the authority of the *Sachems* or chiefs was not only permanent but hereditary. Among the *Natchez* some families were reputed noble, and enjoyed hereditary dignity; the body of the people was considered as vile, and formed for subjection. The will of the great chief is considered as law; the lives of his subjects are absolutely at his disposal. 2 Roberts. 97, 98, &c.

The North Americans above lat. 60° *subsist* chiefly by hunting or fishing. In more temperate latitudes, in addition to these they practise some species of cultivation, 2 Robertson, 83. In the warm climates of South America, the roots which the earth produces spontaneously, fruits, berries and
seeds

seeds, together with lizards and other reptiles supply them with food during some part of the year. At other times they subsist by fishing, 2 Robertson, 79. The North Americans frequently eat their meat and fish raw. Hearne, 315. 316. and the most disgusting vermin, 325.

Their *habitations* are miserable huts intended merely for shelter, without any view to convenience ; the doors so low that it is necessary to creep on the hands and feet in order to enter them, with one large hole in the middle to let out the smoke. Yet some are so large as to contain 80 or 100 persons, occupied by different families, which dwell together without any screen or partition. In the hot climates they form sheds of the branches and leaves of trees, and in the rainy season retire to covers formed by the hand of nature, or hollowed out by their own industry. 2 Roberts. 126, 127.

Their *dress*, the skins of animals in the colder climates, Hearne, 324, in the warmer none at all ; but they bedaub themselves with various ointments to save themselves from the bites of insects. 2 Roberts. 124.

In the warmer climates *polygamy* is practised, but in the colder, where food is difficultly procured, they content themselves with one wife, and the union is easily dissolved. The condition of women is so grievous, and their depression so complete, that servitude is a name too mild to describe their wretched state. 2 Roberts. 73, 74. Hearne, 89, 90, 310,

Yet

Yet Hearne tells us, in the coldest climates men have often from 4 to 6 wives, 88, &c. but a general state of promiscuous intercourse betwixt the sexes was never known. 2 Roberts. 72.

The *disposition* of the Americans is of the worst kind, of a ferocious and brutal nature, (Volney's View, 397.) in general morose, cautious, and unacquainted even with the name of gratitude. The southern Indians carry their vengeance to the greatest excess. Hearne, 307. 2 Roberts. 104. Women entreat their husbands and fathers going to war, to bring them a slave, that they may have the pleasure of killing it. Hearne, 266. The northern Indians are much milder, for let their affronts or losses be ever so great, they never will seek any other revenge but that of wrestling. Murder, so common among the southern Indians, is scarce heard of among them. Yet they pay so little regard to private property as to take every advantage of bodily strength, to rob their neighbours not only of their goods, but of their wives. Hearne, 106, 108. Parents never chastise or even chide their children, who act as if totally independent, and treat their parents with harshness and insolence. 2 Roberts. 77. Nay, even beat their mothers. Volney, 463. The Asiatic savages, on the contrary, behave to their parents in the most affectionate manner. 6 L'Evesque, 326. These wretches, nevertheless, consider themselves as the standard of excellence

lence, and are satisfied with their condition, valuing themselves on their absolute and lawless independence. 2 Roberts. 166. An independence, however totally imaginary, for they are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities with each other. 2 Robert. 133 ; and if taken prisoners are burned alive. But of this more in the sequel.

§ 3.

Of the African Savages.

They are found only in the southern extremity of Africa betwixt lat. 28. and 32. a space originally possessed by various tribes of Hottentots, but of which a great part is at present held by Dutch colonists, by whom many Hottentot tribes are enslaved. Only a few are as yet free, who are called Gonquois Hottentots. 2 Vaillant. 10. 182. and 186. Beyond them are the Cafres, whom I call Barbarians, as they acknowledge the superiority of chiefs, as do indeed all other African tribes, 1 Vaill. 234. What Kolbé relates of their courts of justice is a mere fable. 2 Vaill. 43.

Among the Hottentots all are equally free and independent 2 Vaill. 41. 1 Sparm. 216. 218. Yet it seems each horde has
a sort

a sort of chief whom Sparman calls a *Patriarch*, 2 Sparm. 3. and 1. Vaill. 260. His authority is therefore rather parental than coercive.

They subsist partly by *pasturage*, and partly by *hunting*; those called *Boschiesmen*, often on roots, wild berries and plants, which they eat raw, and are frequently so famished as to be wasted nearly to a shadow. 1 Sparm. 214.

Their *dress* consists of an ointment of fat mixed with soot, with which they besmear themselves, which is never wiped off, and a belt or girdle, from which two pieces of dried skin hang, one before and another behind, which serves to defend them against flies, and also to cool them when in motion, by constant flapping. 1 Barrow, 153. 1 Sparm. 194.

They dwell in villages called *Kraals*; their houses nearly such as those of the American Savages. See 1 Sparm, 184, 207, 213.

Polygamy is permitted, but scarce ever practised. 1 Sparm. 381. 2 Vaill. 43.

As to their *Disposition*, it is acknowledged they are a mild, quiet and timid people, 2 Vaill. 85. harmless, honest and faithful, kind and affectionate to each other. 1 Barrow, 151. not given to violence or revenge, 2 Sparm. 217. However, it is said that they have a horrid custom of burying alive children at the breast, when their mother is interred, 1

Sparm. 384. However, he says this never happens but when their nearest relatives, who are their natural guardians, are dead. No one else will take the trouble of rearing them.

§ 4.

Of European Savages.

I know of none that come at present under this denomination but the Laplanders, and perhaps some Samoieds in Permia. Though they pay tribute to the Russians and Swedes, they are in other respects independent, and have no interior government.

Of the Laplanders, some have fixed habitations, and these subsist by hunting in winter and by fishing in summer. Others lead a wandering life among extensive mountains, and possess numerous herds of Rhen-deer, whose milk and flesh supply them with food. 6 L'Evesque, 443.

Their *dress* consists of a jacket, tight pantaloons, and a surtout, all formed of the skins of Rhen-deer. Of late they use also woollen, which they procure from the Swedes and Russians and coarse linen, which they wear in summer.

Their

Their *habitation* in winter is in a ditch sunk 6 or 8 feet, and covered with moss, reeds and skins of Rhen-deer. Regnier's Account of Lapland. In summer they lodge in huts formed of posts fixed in the earth, and covered with moss and skins, and so low that one cannot stand upright in them. Both have a hole at the top to give a passage to smoke. 6 L'Evesque, 450.

They purchase their *wives* from their fathers, and enter into strict matrimonial contracts, it does not appear that they are polygamists. They have a contempt for women, and think them polluted, and therefore do not permit them to dress their victuals. 6 L'Evesque, 447.

Their *disposition* mild, peaceable, gay and courteous, even to strangers, 6 L'Evesque, 441. Mem. Stock. 1734. 222.

They are much attached to their own independent wandering mode of life, and think themselves the happiest of men. 6 L'Evesque 437. 39. Mem. Stock. 47. Yet of those that border on Norway, many pass into it to enjoy somewhat more of the comforts of life. It is not wonderful that they should prefer even the most indigent independence to the tyrannic disposition of the neighbouring governments.

It is said that the Laplanders originally inhabited a less inhospitable climate, but were driven northward by the Fins and Russians. Mem. Stock. 1734. p. 216.

From this survey of the principal circumstances of savage life, under every climate of the habitable globe, I apprehend it is sufficiently apparent, that it is far indeed from being productive even of that approximation to happiness which mankind is capable of attaining. To such mental pleasures as are referable to *intellect*, *memory* or *imagination*, savages have no pretence. And as those sources of pleasure are unproductive of pain, here is one great deficit in the scale of happiness without any counterpoise of pain. With respect to the pleasures and pains resulting from *affectibility* they feel no pleasing *emotions* but the *expectation* of meeting their prey, and *joy* on obtaining it; but daily experience *vexation* from the miseries they endure, and *rage* and *indignation* at supposed affronts from their brethren. As to *desires*, they are insensible to any but such as are purely instinctive, Most of them court *distinction*, either by their riches, when they possess any, or skill in hunting, or valour in war; but as it is impossible that all should obtain distinction, each village is filled with distrust, jealousy and secret ambushes.* They are universally devoid of gratitude; their chief amusement is dancing, accompanied with drums and singing. But the passion whose gratification yields them the highest pleasure is that of revenge; on exposing their enemies to the most excruciating

* Volney, 397 and 427. To these odious passions the Hottentots and Laplanders are strangers.

ing tortures, they feel a cool and premeditated delight, and it must be owned, that from the same stern, obdurate and inflexible frame of mind, they bear the torments inflicted on them by their enemies with a ferocious, insulting firmness and patience, which some call *fortitude*. With the pleasures of *sympathy* they are totally unacquainted, and the pains of others, not even their enemies, are to them mere matter of sport.

Their females (with only two extraordinary exceptions) they treat not only with inhumanity, but with the most insulting contempt.

The gratification even of their *corporeal* wants can scarcely be called pleasurable or comfortable, at least it is so in the least possible degree. Their food is commonly of the most disgusting kind; and any pleasure it can afford is frequently counterbalanced by the severe abstinence of many days. Their sense of smelling, if not entirely blunted, is assailed by the most fætid odours. Their cloathing harsh and verminiferous. Their habitations, at least in the colder regions, are dens of misery. Cleanliness they systematically avoid.

How then is it possible that any should doubt, as some have, whether with regard to external circumstances, happiness and misery is equally diffused through all states of human life? “ In civilized countries, where regular policies have secured
“ the necessities of life, ambition, avarice, and luxury, find
“ the

“ the mind at leisure for their reception, and soon engage it
 “ in new pursuits that are carried on by incessant labour, and,
 “ whether vain or successful, produce anxiety and contention.
 “ Among savage nations imaginary wants find indeed no
 “ place ; but their strength is exhausted by unnecessary toils,
 “ and their passions agitated, not by contests about superi-
 “ ority, affluence or precedence ; but by perpetual care for the
 “ present day, and by fear of perishing for want of food.*”

But these sceptics have not considered that the miseries of the savage state are the *inevitable* consequences of that situation, whereas those of civilized life, as we shall presently see, arise not from that state, but from *voluntary* indulgence to overgrown passions ; to say nothing of the numerous countervailing pleasures that occur in this state.

In speculating on the origin of mankind, Diodorus, lib. 1 cap. 3. p. 10. informs us, that some philosophers supposed that our species originally existed in a state still more desolate and miserable than any savages now existing, or of whom we have any account ; without language, and consequently without any social intercourse ; subsisting, like other animals, on roots and fruits ; quenching their thirst at the next stream or fountain ; but that at length, through fear of wild beasts, they associated with each other, and formed a language, or
 rather

* Johnson's Life of Drake, 1 Fugitive Pieces, p. 211.

rather different languages. Of this imaginary state, Lucretius, lib. v. 923. gives an enchanting description ; and indeed it is admirably suited to the wild delirious excursions of poetic fancy ; but that the belief of its existence and superior happiness should seriously be obtruded on the common sense of mankind towards the middle of the 18th century, would surely not be credited, had not its existence been confidently supported with astonishing eloquence and subtlety by the famous *Jean Jacques Rousseau*, in a prize discourse on the origin of the inequality among men, offered to a French provincial academy. His discourse did not indeed obtain the prize, yet it made so deep an impression on the minds of many, that *Mr. De la Harpe* affirms it mainly contributed to excite that frenzy which a few years afterwards desolated France.* And this seems also to have been the opinion of *Mr. Volney* ; for he thinks that if *Rousseau* had written in favour of civilization, “ he would have prevented, “ or counterbalanced the false and extravagant bias, the “ sad consequences of which have been exhibited to us “ within these few years.†”

As in this discourse Rousseau affirms not only that mankind originally and during many ages existed in this lowest imaginable state of savage life ; but also that while in that state they have since been in a civilized state, it naturally falls

* Cours de Liter. vol. 16. p. 337.

† Volney's View of America, p. 440. English Edition.

falls within the limits of this essay, to shew 1° that the existence of that state he so loudly vaunts, is perfectly imaginary and groundless. 2dly, that even if it had existed, it would be infinitely more destructive of happiness than a civilized state can, in any possible case, be supposed to be.

And 1°, that men originally existed in a savage state, is directly contrary to the express testimonies of Moses and Sanchoniatho, both the most ancient, and the former the most credible ancient historian now existing. Both agree that all men sprung from a single pair, had a language, formed families, and lived in a social state from their very origin.

To this testimony our orator allows, that religion obliges us to assent, but insists that it does not forbid us to form conjectures grounded on the nature of man, and of the beings that surround us, if God had not intervened. This guarded concession he evidently makes to avoid prosecution, for he presently after throws off the mask, supposes his discourse addressed in Athens to Plato and Xenocrates, and roundly asserts, “ that his account of the original state of man is not “ taken from histories composed by men, who are lyars, but “ from nature, which never lies.”

I shall now briefly state the paradoxes which he imagines to have read in the book of nature, and in brief remarks on each, shew he has falsely interpreted it.

He

He begins by asserting, that man considered abstractedly from all his social, and as he thinks, adventitious acquirements, possessed the following eminent advantages.

1st, That men were less subject to various distempers, than they now are in the civilized state.

This is not agreeable to truth. The savages of modern times who subsist as the ancient savages must have done, by fishing or hunting, and are furnished with many more advantages than Rousseau's fictitious savages could have been, (who must have originally at least, been destitute of fishing tackling and bows and arrows, and who could not find fruits throughout the year, nor possessed any tool for digging up roots, nor even distinguish such as are nourishing, which are not every where to be found,) are notwithstanding extremely subject to consumptions, pleuritic, asthmatic and paralytic disorders, as Dr. Robertson remarks*, who adds, that in the savage state hardships and fatigue violently assault the constitution; and that in polished society intemperance undermines it: that the influence of the former is most extensive, and that whereas the pernicious consequences of luxury reach only to a few members in any community, the distresses of savage life are felt by all. He tells us, that as far as he can judge, the general period of human life is shorter among savages than in well regulated and industrious societies. To

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the

* 2 Roberts. America, p. 61.

the above disorders Volney adds intermitting fevers and pleurisies; from rheumatisms he thinks they would suffer more did they not practise fumigations by means of red hot pebbles*.

In the 2d place our orator roundly asserts, that his primæval savages were stronger than men now are in the social state, who are he says enervated by leading a tender and effeminate life.

But assuredly it cannot be said that the savages of our times lead a tender and effeminate life; yet Dr. Robertson collects from a number of Spanish writers that the savages of South America were much more feeble than Europeans†. Volney extends the same remark to those of North America‡; and L'Evesque, treating of the Asiatic savages says, “ that it is a mistake to think them stronger than other men§.

3dly, Our orator tells us, that his primeval savages had no habitation, and required none, not even cloaths. For that in the warm climates they did not want them, and in the colder they soon appropriated to themselves the skins of the wild beasts that they killed.—

This however is clearly contradicted by facts. All savages, whether of ancient or modern times, had and have some habitation either in caverns, or huts constructed of trees¶: or
in

* Volney, 416.

† 2 Roberts. 44.

‡ Volney, 417.

§ Vol. 7. p. 299.

¶ 2 Roberts. 126.

in ditches covered with hurdles*. And in warm climates most of them cover themselves, at least as much as modesty requires, with leaves or barks of trees or otherwise; and in the colder they cloath themselves with the skins of wild beasts. —But how could Rousseau's savages either kill or flay any beasts, having no instrument of any sort?

4thly, He pretends the primeval savages were destitute of language: he even shews the difficulty or rather the impossibility of the artificial formation of any; and so far I perfectly agree with him; but absolutely deny that men ever existed that had not some language.

5thly, He supposes his primeval savages never to meet each other, or at least only once or twice—a strange paradox! were there no families, no brothers or sisters?

6thly, He thinks it impossible to imagine why one man should want another, any more than a monkey or a wolfe require another of their species; and even if he did, what motive could induce the other to assist him, or if there were any, how they could agree as to the conditions.—This scarcely requires an answer; and if it did, he himself furnishes one, as we shall presently see. That monkies however assist each other on various occasions many travellers assure us†; and wolves are well known to hunt in droves.

T 2

7thly, Yet

* 6 L'Evesque, 34. 2 La Fitau, 18.

† Bingley's Animal Biography, p. 76.

7thly, Yet he owns that man is naturally benevolent. Here there is a motive to assist his fellow man ; but to what purpose if his fellow savages never required his assistance, had no language, and scarce ever met ?

8thly, He affirms that men are depraved by society, which necessitates them to hate each other ; that individual interest always opposes that of the social body.

But that men should become depraved by combining to assist each other is affirmed without any proof. The seller and the buyer may perhaps have opposite interests with respect to the object on sale, but assuredly they do not hate each other as our orator pretends, but on the contrary, for their mutual interests, wish the prosperity of each other. The English merchants made large remittances to the Portuguese after the earthquake of 1755, which destroyed Lisbon. The body of society is composed of individuals ; its interest is therefore the true interest of each.

Yet he objects 9thly, that there is no lawful gain, but may be exceeded by the unlawful.—

This assertion, taken universally as it is laid down, is evidently false ; for on the contrary, unlawful gain, if universally practiced, would soon cease, for even a robber would be robbed in his turn. The lawful is secure, the unlawful precarious.

10th, He

10th, He quotes Maupertuis' calculation, that the evils of social life are far superior to its enjoyments. This I shall examine in the sequel.

11th, He insists that there is no proportion, betwixt the labours men have undertaken, and the happiness of the human species, such as the invention of arts, the acquisition of sciences, levelling of mountains, bursting rocks, rendering rivers navigable, draining morasses, raising enormous buildings, forming lakes, constructing ships, &c.

To this assertion, which is glaringly absurd and entirely gratuitous, I nevertheless answer that the inhabitants of the countries wherein those labours were undertaken (if we except the pyramids of Egypt, the intent of which is not well known) gained advantages fully adequate to their labours. Egypt, for instance, from being a morass, became the most fertile country in the world. So China, Italy, Germany, France, England, &c. Who can deny that the manufactures of leather, woollen, linen, pottery, metallurgy, &c. are useful to the majority of the human species: those who exercise those arts are always fully compensated for their trouble.

12th, The savage when he has dined, is, as our orator supposes, in friendship with his fellows; if any dispute arises, it is terminated by a few blows.

This

This however is far from being true; for a vindictive character is the distinctive feature of almost all savages. Moreover, two savage girls who could speak no language, and circumstanced as Rousseau's primeval savages, were taken in a wood near *Chalons Sur Marne*, A. D. 1731, met, disputed with each other the possession of a chaplet, when one of them killed the other by a violent blow on the head, as the survivor related when taught to speak*.

13th, He also pretends that men and women met each other only by chance, and soon separated.—That love was confined to mere animal instinct, and that his savage though destitute of language and of any fixed habitation, and perhaps not knowing individually any other of his species, not even his own children, was yet fully capable of satisfying his real wants.

This supposition is unsupported by any proof, and is inconsistent with the real nature of man and the continuance of his species. It is well known that even in savage life the preservation of children requires the joint assistance of both parents or their relatives.

14th, He affirms that a savage at liberty never desires to terminate his existence, as many do in civilized life. Here, to his fictitious savages he substitutes modern savages, who possess many more advantages than his primeval savages,
and

* An account of the savage boy found in the woods near *Aveyron*, p. 7. & 8.

and therefore should be more desirous of prolonging it. Yet these when they grow old, desire an end to be put to their existence.* The slightest affliction is sufficient to induce the Kamptschatdales to destroy themselves.† When a savage loses a limb either in war or by disease, he is undone; for how can a cripple resist an enemy, or fish, or hunt, or procure any kind of subsistence, with which no one will supply him? for among them no one has, or can have, any store in resource; every one is reduced to his own casual and variable acquisitions‡. In civilized life scarcely one in a million puts an end to his existence.

15th. Our author confidently asserts, that savages in no part of the world can be persuaded to embrace a civilized life.

Here again he substitutes modern savages to his imaginary primeval, yet he must allow, even granting his own hypothesis, that his primeval savages have adopted a civilized life, since civilized societies actually exist, and by far the greater part of mankind are in a social state. It is however true that adult savages cannot be persuaded to adopt the manners of, and remain among a civilized people; but one of them explained to Mr. Volney why he wished to return to his own tribe. He alleged his ignorance of the language and his inability

* Volney, 414, and 422.

† L'Evesque, 71.

‡ Volney, 422.

ability to exercise the trades and occupations of a civilized people, adding that he would incur the contempt and indignation of his relatives, and of all those with whom he was connected and acquainted ; Volney, 423. But a whole tribe of savages would certainly abandon that state, if they found lands cleared of woods on which they could settle, and a possibility of procuring provisions. This is what in fact happened to some savage tribes on the banks of the Mississippi, who in summer cultivate fields of Indian corn, and in winter follow the chase, and may be said to retain nothing of the savage but the name.* The Caffres, a Hottentot tribe practise agriculture.† The different tribes of wandering Arabs, as often as they find a possibility of procuring provisions in any district, take up their residence in it, and adopt insensibly a settled state, and the arts of cultivation ; so true it is that the settled and cultivated state is that to which mankind is naturally inclined.‡

16th. Our orator quotes an instance from the 5th vol. of Prevost's history of voyages, of a young Hottentot, carefully educated by the governor of the Cape of Good Hope, and taught several languages, who on his return from a visit to his parents restored his European cloaths, and fled with all speed

* Page's Voyages, p. 22. Dub. Edit.

† Thunberg's Voyages. Dodsley's Ann. Regist. for 1793, p. 287.

‡ Volney's Travels in Syria, p. 236, 237. Dublin Edit.

speed to the Hottentot tribe to which he belonged, and never returned to the Cape.

But besides that Kolbe, the author from whom, I think, this tale is taken, is entitled to little or no credit, 1 Sparm. 77. 2 Barrow, 15. 2 Vaillant, 43, 72. Our enthusiastic author forgets to tell us, that the Hottentots who live with the Dutch are in reality enslaved; which accounts for the precipitate flight of this youth (if true) and his preferring to live with his own family and regain his liberty. 1 Sparm. 218.

17th. Lastly, our orator alledges that many abandon civilized life and embrace that of savages.

To which I answer, that this, if it were generally true, would not support his hypothesis; for it is not the destitute state of his primeval savages, but that of modern savages, (who possess many advantages to which his fictitious savages, as he himself supposes, must have been strangers,) that any person had ever embraced, now Mr. Volney informs us, that on diligent inquiry in several parts of America, the unanimous result was, that the adoption of savage life among the American descendants of English or Germans, scarcely happens but to youths under the age of 18, who have been carried off prisoners, which because of the excessive liberty it allows children, is much more pleasing to them than the confinement of schools, and the punishments inflicted on them for their idleness. That as to adults taken and adopted by the

savages, scarcely any can accustom himself to their way of life. Those that voluntarily join the savages are Canadians, generally men of bad character, libertines, idle, of passionate tempers or little understanding. The influence they acquire among the savages flatters their vanity, while the licentious life they lead with the squaws indulges the prevailing passion of their headstrong youth; but when they grow old they scarcely ever fail to return to their country, regretting their rambles when too late*.

Having thus evinced the folly or falsehood of all the arguments of our orator in support of the existence and superior happiness of his imaginary savages, I shall take no notice of what he advances in the second part of his discourse to account for the origin of property, it being foreign to the object I now treat of.

* Volney's *Views*, 418, 419.

CHAP. VI.

*Of the Condition of Mankind under the Barbarian Governments
in America.*

IN treating of the Asiatic and European barbarian governments I omitted those of America, as that part of the globe was chiefly inhabited by savages. Before, however, I enter on the investigation of happiness in more civilized life, it will be necessary to consider in what degree it existed in the few tribes that coalesced into social communities in America.

Of the Government of the Natches and of Bagota.

Doctor Robertson informs us from numerous Spanish authorities,* that among the *Natches*, a nation on the borders of the Mississippi, not only an hereditary nobility was established; but the most unlimited despotism in the person of a single chief. The body of the people was considered as vile and formed for subjection to the will of the chief. All sub-

v 2

mitted

† 2 Roberts. 98.

mitted with implicit obedience ; the lives of his subjects were so absolutely at his disposal, that if any had offended him, he came with profound humility, and offered him his head. Nor did the dominion of the chief cease with his life, for his favourite wives and principal officers were sacrificed at his tomb, with many domestics of inferior rank, that he might be attended in the next world by those that served him in this.

Nothing surely but the most infatuated superstition could render such a government tolerable. And accordingly we are told that the chief was reputed a being of a superior nature.

In Bagota, now a province of New Grenada, there was settled a nation more considerable in number, and more improved in the various arts of life than any people in America, except the Mexicans and the Peruvians. The idea of property was introduced among them and secured by laws handed down by tradition. They subsisted by agriculture ; they lived in large towns, and were decently cloathed ; their houses might be termed commodious, when compared with those of the people around them. Courts of justice were established, which took cognizance of different crimes ; a distinction of ranks was known. Yet their chief or monarch reigned with absolute authority, and so venerated by his subjects that none presumed to look him directly in the face.

2 Roberts.

2 Roberts. 99. 103. The power of this monarch was, probably, though not limited, yet restrained by the prevailing manners, as that of the Danish king is at present. It is not said that they were acquainted with letters, nor how their women were treated, nor what religion they professed. However, they professed some, and their veneration for their chief was founded upon it. A great degree of happiness they probably possessed, and their state may be deemed civilized.

Of the Chilese Government.

The Chilese are divided into numerous tribes ; each hamlet or village has chiefs, who in several points are subject to the supreme chief of the tribe. The succession of these chiefs is established by hereditary right ; but their authority is very limited, that is, merely directive and not coercive. They subsist chiefly by agriculture, raising different esculent plants or roots, pulse of various kinds and potatoes ; rabbits, and a species of camel. The right of private property is fully established and hereditary. They have no written laws, but merely ancient usages.

They manufacture cloaths of the wool of the camel.

They

They live in houses formed of brick, or of wood plastered with clay.

They are unacquainted with letters; Yet they have attained a wonderful knowledge of astronomy.

There are other circumstances that strongly counteract these advantages. *Polygamy* is allowed and practised by all who can afford it, and women are condemned to servile labour. Children are never corrected, their insolence is even encouraged. Husbands and fathers are not subject to any punishment for killing their wives or children. Crimes deemed worthy of death are treachery, voluntary homicide, adultery, robbery and witchcraft. Witches are first tortured by fire, and then stabbed with daggers. Justice is administered in an irregular and tumultuous manner, without any preliminary formalities. Public justice is either ill administered, or entirely abandoned to the caprice of individuals: in such a state the abode of happiness can be merely casual. This account is extracted from the 2d volume of the history of Chili, written by Don Jean Ignatius Molina, a native of that country, and published in 1787.

Of

Of the Mexican Government.

In the Mexican empire the sovereignty was originally vested in monarchs elected from the members of a particular family, whose authority was at first limited, but under the reign of the last emperor became despotic. 3 Roberts. 133.

His subjects consisted of various classes of nobility, whose titles and possessions were hereditary ; but the great body of the people were in a very humiliating state. Even those considered as freemen were treated by their haughty lords as beings of an inferior nature ; and domestics might be killed by their masters with impunity.

The right of private property was established in its full extent ; hence agriculture and various arts had made some progress.

There were also courts of justice whose decisions were usually equitable. But they had no written laws, nor appear to be acquainted with letters.

Their habitations were mean stragling huts, formed of earth and stones. In the city of Mexico and some others they were equally mean, but more orderly.

Their disposition was in the highest degree ferocious. They were incessantly engaged in hostilities, and were chiefly intent

tent on making prisoners, all of whom they put to death and devoured. On the death of any distinguished person a certain number of his attendants were chosen to accompany him to the other world, put to death and buried in the same tomb.

The victims of superstition who seem not to have been foreigners, but native Mexicans, and probably of the lowest class, were still more numerous. For according to the most accurate account, they amounted to 2500 annually. Robertson, 315.

This empire must then be deemed *semi-barbarian*.

Of the Peruvian Government.

This government was perfectly theocratic. Mango Capac and his wife pretended they were children of the sun. He was their first *Inca* or sovereign, and none but his descendants could aspire to the sovereignty. His authority was considered as that of the divinity, and therefore implicitly obeyed. 3 Roberts. 164, &c.

Among the Peruvians a great inequality of ranks prevailed, and the great body of the inhabitants were held in a state of servitude.

The

The state of property was no less singular than that of religion. All the lands capable of cultivation were divided into three shares; one consecrated to the Sun and destined for the support of religion. The second belonged to the Inca for the support of government. The third, and largest share, was reserved for the maintenance of the people among whom it was parcelled out. No person however had an exclusive property in the portion allotted to him—he possessed it only for a year, when a new division was made, in proportion to the rank, number, and exigencies of each family. All those lands were cultivated by the joint industry of the community. Hence their agriculture was extensive, and conducted with more skill than in any part of America.

Their *houses* were built of stone, brick or wood, as convenience required, and sufficiently commodious, though without any windows. In all arts they made a greater progress than the Mexicans.

All crimes were punished capitally, being looked upon as insults to the deity.

Yet their *disposition* was mild and gentle even to prisoners of war, whom they never put to death, but incorporated with themselves.

The horrid custom that prevailed among the most savage tribes subsisted among them. On the death of their Incas or other eminent persons, a considerable number of their attend-

ants were put to death, that they might be properly attended in the other world. On the death of Huana Capac 1000 persons were doomed to accompany him to his tomb. Thus, upon the whole, this government must be deemed only *semi-civilized*.

The foregoing account is extracted from 3 Robertson.

Of some anomalous States.

Among these I denote that of the ancient Germans; that of the Otaheitans, and that of the inhabitants of the Pelew Islands; in which a mixture of savage, barbarian, and civilized manners and modes of living were observed.

Of the ancient Germans.

Of the German tribes many were governed by kings, but most had chiefs or leaders chosen for their valour. The authority even of their kings was limited, except among the *Suiones*. They had, for the most part, a class of nobility, out of which their kings were chosen. (I say for the most part,
for

for I think the *Franks* had none.) In fact there were three classes; that of the nobility, that of freemen, and that of slaves. Of matters of small importance their chiefs decided; but the more weighty were referred to a council, formed of the whole tribe. By these councils state criminals were tried.

They *subsisted* chiefly by hunting or rapine; and though they disdained agriculture, yet they divided their lands every year, and raised some corn. Some subsisted on wild berries, and venison and curds. Most had beer, and some wine.

Their *habitations* were formed of rude materials, without any cement; always filthy, as their beasts dwelled among them. Some lodged in caverns or ditches covered with dung.

Their *cloathing*, a cloak or jerkin formed of the skins of wild beasts.

They were not strangers to *property*, for their children inherited.

For *women* they had the highest respect; they supposed them to possess a sanctity and prudence more than human; hence they were frequently consulted. Polygamy scarce ever existed, and adultery was rarely known; and when known severely punished. *Villeda* was honoured as a goddess. *Aurinia* and many more were merely venerated.

Their principal amusement was gaming, and this they pursued to such excess as to stake even their own personal liberty, and steadily maintained their engagements. To gratitude they were absolute strangers, but their hospitality was boundless and indiscriminate.

Injuries were avenged by the injured family, but even homicide might be compensated by a certain number of sheep or cattle.

See Tacitus de Moribus Germanorum, and 1 Gibbon, 345.

Of the Otaheitans.

Otaheite being situated in a delightful and healthy climate, its inhabitants enjoy more happiness than any people hitherto mentioned except the *Peruvians*. Their happiness however is wholly of the sensual kind, and debased by various criminal practices, partly of the savage and partly of the barbarian kind.

They consist of three classes of men, the nobility or chiefs, freemen and common people or servants, who are held in the lowest and most degrading servitude, but the principal authority resides in a king stiled *Eree di hoi*.

Their

Their *food*, pork, poultry, bread fruit, bananas, yams, fish, apples, dog's flesh. However, it is only the chiefs who have flesh daily served to them,

Their *dress* is not only decent but graceful ; it is formed of cloth made of the macerated fibres of the inner bark of a tree, spread out and beaten together.

Their habitations are commodious and thatched with the leaves of the plantain tree.

Women (I suppose those of the second or third class) were educated without any sense of modesty, and treated with the most marked contempt. Men might have as many wives as they could maintain, and divorce them at pleasure, nay, destroy their children. They were not suffered to eat with their husbands, and were excluded from a share of the best sorts of food. The unmarried were frequently led to prostitution by their fathers and brothers. There even existed a confraternity of nobles who kept concubines in common, and purposely destroyed their children.

Their disposition was mild and gentle towards each other, but when engaged in hostilities they treated their prisoners with the most inhuman cruelty. Hence they can scarcely be accounted even *semi-civilized*.

This account is taken from 2 Cook's Voy. 155, &c. and 1 Hawks. Collection, 148. 154. 290. 313. 314.

Of

Of the condition of Mankind in the civilized State.

The civilized state is that in which different families are associated for the protection of their natural rights, namely, life, liberty, property, and safety, together with such advantages, as may be gained by the united power of the society.

It originated on the cessation of the general patriarchal government, when the different families of mankind were no longer subject to a common parent. But the first attempt to obtain this protection was grossly defective. The whole power of the association was confided to a single person, probably from the constantly recurring necessity of defence against foreign foes, or from the lust of conquest. The will of the prince gradually became the governing principle by which the public force was in every instance directed, and the rule by which his subjects were obliged to regulate their actions, or in other words, the law. Subjects were indeed often protected against external hostile aggressions, but in no case were their natural rights sufficiently secured against the despot himself; hence I termed these governments *barbarian*. In process of time, however, several of these received gradual

dual improvements, and in proportion to these, merit the title of *civilized*.

Hence the *natural* or original state of mankind was that of filial subjection to a common parent; this was succeeded by the barbarian, which in many instances was refined into the civilized. That which Hobbes and many other philosophers and jurists call the *state of nature*, is nothing more than that of men abstractedly considered, and never had a real existence.

The mere possession of property is not a characteristic of civilization, nor was property originally a creature of law or society, for it was for the secure possession of property previously acquired, that different families originally associated, except perhaps some wandering tribes, who distributed among themselves by lot or otherwise, the lands of a territory in which they newly settled. In such cases, landed property and the course of its subsequent acquisition, transmission or disposition may justly be called the creature of law. This is so true, that even savages claimed and enjoyed a property not only in common, but individually, in the portion of land necessary for their subsistence, as I have already shewn.

The degrees of civilization are various, according to the variable extent and degree of protection and security afforded
to

to the natural rights of men, and the number and importance of the advantages procured for them by the power of the society.

With regard to *extent*, the lowest degree of civilization is that in which protection is unequally distributed. Hence those nations in which the rights of women and children, or of any particular class or sect of the society are injured, or not sufficiently protected, even supposing those of the higher classes to be respected, must be accounted only semi-civilized.

Again, as to the degree of civilization, that state must be deemed most perfectly civilized, in which the natural rights of the inhabitants are most perfectly secured, from the encroachments of the sovereign himself, the injustice or illegal aggressions of individuals, and the hostilities of foreign foes, in which every other advantage contributing to the general comfort and ease of the inhabitants obtains.

The degree of civilization which the greater part of Europe has already attained, is chiefly to be attributed to the benign influence of christianity. The advantages derived from it are well enumerated by the Rev. Mr. Ryan, in a learned work, entitled, an *History of the Effects of Religion on Mankind*.*
To

* And Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, B. 24. C. 3.

Much however is due to chivalry ; and philosophy may justly claim a share.

To chivalry European society is indebted for polished manners, a high sense of honour, fidelity to sovereigns, and respect for the female sex. To philosophy we owe the cessation of trials by ordeal, and of the judicial (I wish I could also say extra-judicial) trials by battle ; the discredit of witchcraft or magic, an imaginary crime for which many thousands have been condemned to death ; and the general prevalence of religious toleration.

It must be confessed, however, that most European countries are, as yet, but imperfectly civilized ; in most of them an absolute unlimited authority is at present, and has been for some ages, vested in a single person whose power is supported by a numerous disciplined army ; hence it is frequently abused, and those rights for the preservation of which men originally associated, are frequently grossly violated, by arbitrary imprisonments, heavy, unequal and unnecessary impositions, severe restraints on the communication of knowledge, and in many by punishment, even unto death, of those who adopt speculative religious opinions different from those authorised by the state. Those guilty of this atrocity cannot surely reproach the Mexicans with their execrable human sacrifices.

Thus far I have been obliged to enlarge on the nature of civilization, as it has not hitherto been sufficiently defined ; but shall at present confine myself to the examination of the degree of happiness enjoyed, or that may be enjoyed, under that government which appears to me to approach most to perfect civilization, namely, that under which we have the good fortune to live*.

The essential rights of men being sufficiently secured to them, or at least presumed to be so, by the united powers of the society at large (an advantage which cannot be obtained by the solitary efforts of disunited individuals ;) they have the leisure and opportunity of pursuing that course of life proportioned to their abilities, which seems to them most productive of pleasure, and least exposed to pain.

The inhabitants of all countries may be ranged under four general divisions or classes ; namely, the *opulent*, the *rich*, the *poor* and the *indigent*.

The *opulent* are those who in addition to the necessities and comforts of life, possess also its luxuries, superfluities and pageantry.

The

* I do not deny that a great degree of happiness prevailed among the middling classes of society in many parts of the continent, until about 70 years ago, when Frederic the 2^d introduced the system of *misery*—the *conscription*, into Europe, which has since been adopted by other sovereigns. The happiness enjoyed by a very numerous part of the French people before the year 1789, is attested by *Marmontel* in his Memoirs.

The *rich* I call those who, without manual labour, possess the necessities, comforts and decencies suited to their rank in society, without any refined luxuries or ostentatious superfluities.

The *poor* are those who by manual labour acquire the necessities, and many at least of its comforts for themselves and their families, but not its luxuries.

The *indigent* are those who cannot even by *manual* labour (of which they are often incapable) gain the necessities of life*.

The *necessaries of life* are wholesome *food*, an habitation so contrived as to secure the inhabitant against the inclemency of the seasons, *fire* and sufficient *cloathing*, *dry materials to rest on*, and the *means* of procuring those necessities†.

I call *comfort* whatever frees us from uneasiness, and contributes to our conveniencies or pleasures.

By *luxuries* I understand, 1st, objects which are chiefly valued as ornamental, costly or fashionable.

y 2

2dly, Various

* Doctor Adam Smith has much enlarged the notion of necessities; for he comprehends under that name, not only those things that nature, but those which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest ranks of the people, as linen shirts, and shoes for men, though not for women. *Smith on the Wealth of Nations*, vol. 3. p. 332; all besides he calls luxuries. However, as Julius Cæsar and the richest Romans could do without linen shirts, as well as many modern tribes, I cannot consent to call them *necessaries*, but rather *comforts*.

† This necessary distinction was first made by Mr. Colquhoun.

2dly, Various delicacies and refinements, so contrived as to flatter the senses, particularly those of taste and smell.

Indulgence to the desire of possessing such objects and delicacies is called *luxury**.

Betwixt these principal classes (of each of which, except the last, there are various degrees) there exist various intermediate *conditions*, participating of those classes betwixt which they lie, as the *industrious* and the *professional*, which lie betwixt the poor and the rich; and the *official*, which, according to the nature of the office, lies either betwixt the poor and the rich, or betwixt the rich and the opulent.

It may, I think, be laid down as evident maxims, 1^o, that the principal source of pleasure to mankind consists in the prudent gratification of innocent and attainable *desires*; the pleasing emotions arising therefrom, and just and benevolent sentiments, together with the intervenient tranquil *hope* of such gratification. And 2^{do}, that *complex* pleasures are by far the most durable and valuable.

As the gratification of our desires relates to a future period, prudence requires that we should examine first the probability of our attaining that period: as it were idle to aim at a gratification obtainable only at a period to which it is improbable we should arrive; or to undervalue any advantage obtainable

* From *λυω*, solvo, as it was supposed to relax and unnerve the mind.

obtainable at a period which it is highly probable we should attain.

2dly, The probability or practicability of our obtaining at that period the advantage sought for. 3dly, That we should calculate and compare the pains, labour, time and expense necessary for its attainment, with the real value of that advantage.

I scarce need add, that the probability of a future *danger* or other *evil* should be examined in the same manner, and its magnitude compared with the pains, labour and expence necessary to avoid and escape from it.

The probability of the event first mentioned has been calculated by several. I shall only quote a few cases from *De Parcieux*, premising that I consider $\frac{9}{10}$, or even $\frac{8}{10}$ as high probabilities. By his table it appears that of 806 healthy persons of the age of 21 years, 798 arrive at the age of 22, that is 99 out of 100, or 990 out of 1000, which is a high probability.

So of 1000 at the age of 21, 900 will arrive at the age of 31, or 900 out of 1000, or 90 out of 100, which is also a high probability.

So of 1000 of the age of 21, 815 will attain the age of 40 years, or little more than 81 out of 100, or about $\frac{8}{10}$, and the probability that a healthy man of 40 will attain the age of 50 is $\frac{8 \cdot 8 \cdot 4}{1000}$.

The

The other probabilities should also be examined, but cannot be so accurately estimated or calculated.

Prudence then, which is nothing more than practical wisdom, is the surest guide to happiness; by it we guard against future wants, ensure future advantages, avoid future dangers, and decline from whatever may probably be destructive of the former, or productive of the latter. It requires that in all cases of delicacy or moment, the safer alternative should be chosen, though the least probable, in preference to the most probable, if the failure of this would be attended with any important danger or loss.* So also, if the success of the least probable would be attended with advantages of greater importance than the danger or loss arising from the failure of the most probable alternative.†

It also demands a cautious and discreet selection of the means, order, time and circumstances best suited to the attainment of the desired end.

Imprudence consists in acting with *precipitation, inattention, to probabilities, presumption, rashness, indiscretion, want of caution, neglect* of that estimation and comparison above recommended, *inconstancy* and *levity*, altering from inadequate causes, resolutions already formed, &c.

I now

* On this principle the practice of insurance is founded.

† This was the practice of Suwarrow, and other great generals.

I now proceed to examine whether, and in what degree happiness may be expected in the different classes above mentioned.

The general desire of the *opulent* is the acquisition of *power* ; that of the *rich* is to obtain *opulence* ; that of the *poor* is to acquire *riches* ; and that of the *indigent* is to attain *relief*.

But *sensual pleasure* is the principal pursuit of the generality of each class while young.

There is also a fifth description of men, namely, the *philosophic* or *literary* ; too few, perhaps, to form a class, whose principal pleasure is mental exercise, and the attainment of knowledge. Such persons are chiefly found among professional men, and some among the rich, or at least, of those who have obtained a competency.

The general desire of youth is directed to the gratification of mere animal propensities, sexual intercourse, the luxuries of the table, violent exercise, and a round of amusements.

When a young man arrives at the age of 21, being then at his own disposal, he finds the company and conversation of persons of superior age irksome, his want of experience unfits him for entering into it, and the silence he is obliged to observe disgusts him. Hence he carefully avoids it, and seeks the society of those of nearly his own age, whose inclinations are congenial with his own. By their excitements and
examples

examples—he is encouraged to vicious pursuits; the first precept of *prudence* is therefore to avoid such company.

The pursuit of illicit connexions with the opposite sex leads to the commission of various crimes, the basest deceit, seduction of the innocent, the affectation of love, where the most cruel injury is premeditatedly intended; its gratification transient, frequently followed by disgust, and constantly with the misery of the deluded object, and the affliction of the families nearly connected and allied with it; infallibly followed by shame and remorse, often by a serious loss of property, through the legal infliction of damages, and invariably by the contempt and abhorrence of all considerate men. Promiscuous gratification, on the other hand, generally intails or generates the most loathsome diseases.

Other evils resulting from the thoughtless indulgence of youthful desires are derived from improvident marriages, involving the parties and their growing families in distresses and embarrassments for which nothing can compensate.

Immoderate indulgence of the pleasures of the table is generally attended with expences ruinous to fortune; its transient gratifications gradually impair the constitution, and lay the foundation of various painful distempers, which far surpass both in duration and intensity, the pleasures that occasioned them. This observation is applicable with equal certainty to the pleasure of intoxication, which moreover frequently

frequently leads to the commission of the most shameful follies, and even of atrocious crimes.

Thus we see how miserably these are deceived whose idea of happiness centers in compliance with those desires. *Exercise* is necessary to health at all ages, but its violent exertions are attended by dangers often fatal to human life.

Amusements pursued with moderation are necessary relaxations from the more serious and interesting occupations; but when considered and sought as the sole business of life, they occasion an irreparable neglect of its more important concerns, and some of them, particularly gaming, with absolute ruin, both of property and repute.

Power is agreeable to all men, as far as it relates to dominion over their own actions; in this sense it coincides with the love of liberty and independence; but power over others is most commonly the peculiar aim only of the opulent class of society; its acquisition is considered by them as the source of the greatest happiness. It flatters their pride, fosters the high estimation they entertain of their own talents and dignity, and obliges or induces others to concur in the gratification of their wishes.

Its *pursuit* is however attended with circumstances much more productive of pain than of pleasure; under despotic monarchies it is generally attainable only by mean intrigue, degrading servility, perfidious hypocrisy, profound dissimu-

lation and gross flattery of those who secretly are held in the utmost contempt. Under limited monarchies, the first step to its attainment, is a seat in the legislative assembly, which indeed to the opulent is seldom a matter of much difficulty, and the second is connexion with a party, and adoption of all its measures whether right or wrong ; this principle is now generally received ; but when acted upon, must, to a virtuous mind, be frequently productive of the most painful feelings ; obstinate resistance from the opposite party must be experienced ; the contest frequently lasts many years, embittered with unceasing vexation, and during its continuance, counterbalanced by no pleasure, but fallacious hopes constantly disappointed.

But secondly, supposing the efforts of a party finally crowned, with success, and its leader invested with the plenitude of ministerial power, still its duration is precarious, attended with anxiety, misrepresentation of its views, calumny and abuse, often unmerited, forced compliances with the desires of the sovereign, often unreasonable, and even with his favourites, if he has any, and a heavy responsibility for failures of success of measures however wisely planned.

The only compensation of all these evils is the intoxicating pride of superiority, and that of rewarding with places, pensions and honours its most active supporters, together

ther with the malignant satisfaction of displacing its opponents.

Yet precarious and sickly as is the enjoyment of power, its turbulent solicitude is esteemed by most of those who possessed it, a lesser evil than the gloomy vacuity, and insipid tranquillity of still life which succeeds to its loss ; and it were well if that were all, for it is not unfrequently followed by ignominy and contempt, or even legal prosecution. What then can be the happiness of a state, whose precarious possession is less pleasurable than either its acquisition or loss are painful ?

Yet so deeply rooted is the desire of most men to attain power, that the Grand Council of Venice, though consisting of upwards of 400 members, patiently endured for three centuries, and indeed to the final dissolution of the republic, the annual despotism of the state inquisitors, though they had every year the power of subverting it, rather than forego the hope of succeeding to it, though only for one year.*

The general and principal desire of the *rich*, when arrived at the middle period of life, though placed in the happiest circumstances of ample competence and tranquillity, is to attain a state of *opulence* which from its exterior pomp, splendor and parade, they fondly prefigure to themselves as a state
of

of sublimer happiness than that which they enjoy. This desire originates in unbounded *vanity*, as that of power does from the arrogance of *pride*. Nor is the pursuit of the former attended with incidents much less painful than those that occur in the pursuit of the latter. The more substantial pleasures of life, nay, even the more refined gratifications of sense are necessarily sacrificed to its attainment; a system of austere frugality, not to say avarice, must rigidly be adhered to; the proper education of children neglected, the demands of friendship, of benevolence, generosity and charity rejected. Visionary schemes are often adopted, ending in disappointment and loss. Unremitting vigilance and anxiety to prevent the frauds of inferior agents, oppression of tenants by the extortion of extravagant rents, purchases of bad titles, tedious and expensive litigations, are a few of the numerous vexations that attend the pursuit of opulence; a pursuit which knows no precise limit; and though its object should to a certain degree be attained, yet it seldom can be enjoyed, by reason of the different habits necessary for its acquisition, and for its enjoyment. If it succeeds in attracting respect from the vulgar, this pleasure must be blunted, if not annihilated by the grating reflection that even this futile regard is not grounded on personal or even ancestral merit, but solely on adventitious external advantages, that dazzle the vulgar only. Hence it is evident, that the
pains

pains attending this pursuit, and even its final success, far exceed both in number, duration and intensity any pleasures it can afford.

To sum up all, I shall conclude with the sage advice of Doctor Johnson : “ When, therefore, the desire of wealth is “ taking hold of the heart, let us look round and see how it “ operates on those whose industry or fortune has obtained “ it. When we find them oppressed with their own abundance, luxurious without pleasure, idle without ease, impatient and querulous in themselves, and despised or hated “ by the rest of mankind, we shall soon be convinced, that “ if the real wants of our condition are satisfied, there remains little to be sought with solicitude, or desired with “ eagerness.”

The predominant desire of the *poor* is to obtain riches ; a desire which under the guidance of prudence is perfectly rational, since *money* is the representative of most of the necessities, and of many of the comforts that contribute to render existence a blessing ; without some share of it, poverty may, by many casualties sink into *indigence* ; its possession renders them independent, and rescues them from that contumely, neglect and insult to which they are otherwise exposed.

But to obtain even a moderate pittance of money, what struggles are not the poor obliged to maintain ! what hardships

ships to endure ! the inclemency of the seasons while toiling abroad, or irksome confinement, while labouring within doors, scanty enjoyment of food, or firing, cloathing insufficient for their wants, either by day or at night, miserable, sordid smoky inconvenient huts, or humiliating ssrvitude. Such is the lot of the poor in most countries.

Neither are they exempt from the *moral* pains of the rich, with this difference, that the rich may avoid them if they please ; but the poor are much more exposed to them, and in a manner compelled to endure them. Unceasing solicitude and anxiety, corroding envy, mortified pride, discontent, distressing disappointments, and numerous temptations to fraud, theft, robbery, and perjury.

Even their *pleasures* are of a baser alloy ; delicacy and refinement are always banished from them ; that of intoxication, pernicious as it is, is indeed common to both rich and poor ; but that of the rich is produced by delicious draughts, that of the poor by impure, muddy, and often nauseous liquors. From mental pleasures, the acquisition of science, refined taste and rational conversation, they are, with a few exceptions, totally excluded. Their usual amusements are of the grossest and most despicable kind—attention to wild extravagant fictions ; uncouth lamentable ditties ; indecent buffoonery ; scurrilous farces ; ridiculous pantomimes, and other inhuman sports.

Yet

Yet a late very ingenious and original writer on the principles of moral science tells us, “ that an European merchant who “ lives in a palace surrounded by luxuries, but whose wants “ have increased with his riches (that is, who still continues “ his traffic) has little reason to boast of superior happiness “ to what the Hottentot enjoys in his hut, in the midst of his “ cows and his swine*.” As well may he tell us that a savage feeding on a half putrified whale, is as happy as an Alderman feeding on turtle. It is certain that extreme hunger renders the coarsest food highly agreeable ; but it is by affording *relief from pain*, rather than by conferring positive pleasure. Dr. Paley thinks, that “ the luxurious receive no greater pleasure “ from their dainties, than the peasant does from his bread “ and cheese†.”—This is evidently confounding the pleasures of taste. If so, the peasant would never require meat or any thing else. Hence it appears very evident, that in whatever aspect we view the condition of the poor, its pains will be found far to exceed its pleasures ; both in number, duration and poignancy ; and consequently far inferior to the share of happiness which the rich have, at least the power of enjoying, but the poor have not, supposing both equally governed by the rules of prudence. The slightest infraction of these rules may prove fatal to the poor, but is easily remedied or repaired by the rich. The poor may lie in jail during life for a debt
of

* p. 12.

† Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 24.

of ten or twenty pounds ; the rich, even if distressed, easily find bail, or soon discharge a similar or much larger debt. To obtain justice for rights withheld, or wrongs suffered, is often attended with considerable expense, both of time and money, and constant vigilance and attention. To the rich these requisites are possible, to the poor impossible.

Thus we find that the assertions of many celebrated writers are grounded on very superficial observations, rather than on a close and accurate inspection of the real state of these different classes of civilized society. Dr. Paley affirms, “ that happiness is pretty equally distributed among the different orders of civil society, a maxim which (he says) is laid down in most books of morality* ; but which he thinks has been seldom supported by any solid reasons.” Let us then consider those by which he supports it.

1^o, with regard to the *pleasure of superiority*, he tells us, “ that if a farmer can shew better cattle than any other farmer in the *hundred*; or if a lord have a larger estate than any other nobleman in the county ; if a king possess more extensive territories than any prince in Europe ; in all these cases, the parties feel an equal satisfaction in their superiority.”

But surely if the farmer could shew better cattle than any other farmer in the kingdom ; or the lord a greater estate than

* Paley, b. 1. chap. 6.

than any other nobleman in the kingdom ; or if the king were master of all Europe, would they not respectively feel much higher satisfaction in their superiority ?—Hence the pleasure arising from the gratification of the desire of superiority, increases with the number of equals over whom it is attained, and consequently is not equal in the cases above mentioned.

He also thinks, “ that the pleasures of ambition, which
 “ are supposed to be peculiar to high stations, are in reality
 “ common to all conditions.”—(So they are, but not in the same degree.) “ The farrier who shoes a horse better, and
 “ is in greater request for skill than any man within 10 miles
 “ of him, possesses, for all that I can see, the delight of *dis-*
 “ *tinction* as truly and substantially as the statesman, the
 “ soldier and the scholar, who have filled all Europe with
 “ the reputation of their wisdom, their valour, or their
 “ knowledge.”

Here the doctor confounds the pleasure of *ambition*, which consists in the desire of power, with that of *distinction*, which denotes the desire of attracting attention ; and to this latter his examples apply. What he means by *substantially*, as distinct from *truly*, I do not understand ; but is it possible that he should confound the *simple* pleasure of the farrier, arising from the trifling regard of his few neighbours, with the *complex* multifarious pleasure of the statesman, who has promoted the prosperity of his country, of the soldier who has valiantly defended it, or of the philosopher, who is honoured and res-

pected by all Europe for his scientific discoveries and improvements. Can he compare the glory of *Newton*, of *Lavoisier*, of *Franklin*, of *Adam Smith*, with the puny satisfaction of an obscure farrier?

Even Mr. Hume was of opinion, that all pleasures of the same species were equal; for he says, that all that are happy are equally happy; and by happiness he certainly understood pleasure. He pretends that “a little miss with a new gown
“ at a dancing school ball, receives as great enjoyment as a
“ general at the head of a victorious army, or the greatest
“ orator who triumphs in the splendor of his eloquence,
“ while he governs the passions and resolutions of a nume-
“ rous assembly.*”—This Doctor Johnson denied, adding, that “a peasant and a philosopher may be equally *satisfied*,
“ but not equally happy. Happiness consists in the multi-
“ plicity of agreeable consciousness. A peasant has not the
“ capacity of having equal happiness with a philosopher.” And Boswell adds, “I remember this question very happily
“ illustrated by Mr. Robert Brown at Utrecht;—a small
“ drinking glass, said he, may be equally full, but a large
“ one holds more than the small.”†

The equality of pleasures is also deemed certain by the ingenious author of principles of moral philosophy; “There is,”
(says

* *Essays*, 4to, p. 102.

† *Life of Johnson*, vol. 1. p. 428.

“ says he) “ little doubt, that a profligate, possessed of health
 “ and thoughtless vivacity, is as happy a Being as a Newton,
 “ embracing the universe in his sublime conceptions.—It is
 “ no good answer to this, that the happiness of the latter is of a
 “ higher kind than that of the former ;—we cannot be more
 “ than fully blest.—A happy child does not enjoy less plea-
 “ sure than a happy man ; and a happy fool is as blessed as a
 “ happy philosopher*.” Who does not see that all these pa-
 radoxes are founded on mistaking *pleasure* for *happiness*, and
 confounding *complex* with *simple* pleasures ?

Even the general position on which most moralists agree, namely, that the universal aim of mankind is to attain happiness, seems to me unfounded. Few men lay down any such plan. To receive pleasure and avoid pain, as either occurs, is the constant aim of mankind. Happiness is an abstract notion, involving a comprehension of present and future, which seldom presents itself to the imagination of any one but in a vague manner. The present alone engrosses general attention ; even professions are commonly chosen to obtain support, without any explicit view to happiness in any sense of the word.

The condition of the *indigent* is more degrading, but abstracting from the bodily pains or disorders under which they
 2 A 2 labour,

* Forsyth, p. 13.

labour, is in other respects scarcely inferior to that of the poor. From the number of hospitals, poor houses, and other charitable institutions in all parts of Europe; and the liberality of the convents in those of the Latin communion; and the general commiseration of the rich in all Christian and even Mahometan countries, the indigent are seldom in want of food, habitation or raiment: In so much, that many of them prefer the state of mendicity to that of the labouring poor.

It now remains to consider the condition of another description of men to be found in most civilized countries, though too few perhaps in any, to form one of the great subdivisions of the social body: It consists of persons possessed of competent fortunes*, and of others attached to learned professions, enjoying sufficient leisure and property; whose principal occupation is the exercise of their understanding in philosophical pursuits. The pleasures attending this exercise are so *intense*, as to engross the whole attention; so numerous, as to admit no limit; and as durable as the health of those engaged in it. They are perfectly innocent, and generally useful; they neither exact the multiplied labours of the *legal* profession; nor are they attended with the disgusts
and

* By a *competent* fortune I understand that which is sufficient for procuring, not only the necessaries and comforts, but also the decencies suited to one's situation and rank in society.

and frequent disappointments of the *medical*; nor with the dangers, perplexities, or solicitude of the *military*. They require little external assistance—a few books, instruments to work with, and materials to work upon—the modern library of a lawyer is much more expensive. Great were the discoveries of the immortal Scheele, with the help of very few instruments. Some departments of science require none at all. They provoke neither envy nor contention, or at least very seldom. How great must have been the pleasure of a Napier, a Briggs, a Newton and a Bernouilli, while intent on the most laborious calculations? or of a Boyle, a Black, a Priestly, and a Lavoisier, discovering and scrutinizing the invisible agents of nature, as Newton did the connecting principle of the stupendous masses that surround us. Or of a Locke and a Berkeley in their profound researches? Moreover, these studies cannot fail to impress the firmest conviction, of the power, wisdom and goodness of the Creator of the universe; and inspire corresponding sentiments of piety, obedience and resignation to his will: and thus extend happiness beyond the limits of our present existence.

Pursuits of this nature seem to me to be best calculated to produce happiness, affording the purest pleasures, and being least exposed to adventitious pains.

A life devoted to acts of benevolence and piety, as that of Mr. Howard and the late Lady Arabella Denny, affords the
sublimest

sublimest present pleasures and the least envied, together with the most encouraging hopes of future happiness.

Next to the pleasures resulting from the exercise of the *understanding*, and those of the *moral sense*, we may rank those of the *imagination*, in the composition of poetry, painting and music. These, however, being derived from innate powers, of which nature is very sparing, can fall to the lot of very few. *Quos Jupiter æquus amavit.*

Of the pleasures of serious studies of any sort, Dr. Young gives an eloquent description in a letter to the author of Sir Charles Grandison, of which the following is an extract* :

“ Composition, to men of letters and leisure, is not only a
 “ noble amusement, but a sweet refuge ; it improves their
 “ parts and promotes their peace ; it opens a back door out
 “ of the bustle of this busy and idle world, into a garden of
 “ moral and intellectual fruits, the key of which is denied to
 “ the rest of mankind ; when stung with idle anxieties, or
 “ teized with fruitless impertinence, or yawning over insipid
 “ diversions, then we see the blessings of a lettered recess ;
 “ then we retire to our disinterested and immortal friends in
 “ our closet, and find our minds, when applied to some fa-
 “ vourite theme, as naturally and as easily quieted and re-
 “ freshed as a peevish child when laid to the breast. Our
 “ happiness

* British Plutarch, vol. 2. p. 222. Irish edition.

“ happiness no longer lives on charity, nor bids fair for a
 “ fall, by leaning on that most precarious and thorny pillow
 “ another’s pleasure, for our repose. How independent
 “ of the world is he, who can daily find new acquaintance,
 “ that at once entertain and improve him. These advan-
 “ tages composition affords, whether we write ourselves, or in
 “ more humble amusement, peruse the works of others.
 “ Moreover, if we consider life’s endless evils, what can be
 “ more prudent than to provide for consolation under them?
 “ A consolation under them, the wisest men have found in
 “ the pleasures of the pen. Witness among many more,
 “ Thucydides, Xenophon, Tully, Pliny the younger, who
 “ says, *in uxoris infirmitate et amicorum periculo aut morte*
 “ *turbatus, ad studia, unicum doloris Levamentum confugio.*”

At an advanced period of life at least, the study of the scriptures and of the doctrines of Christianity, is by far the most satisfactory and consolatory.

I do not deny that some share of happiness may be obtain-
 ed by some individuals engaged in the busy, active, and in-
 dustrious occupations of society, that is, upon the whole, the
 sum of their pleasures may be found to exceed that of their
 pains and labours ; but the number of persons so fortunate
 I believe to be very small, and much indebted to chance ;
 their pleasures are not so *pure*, for they frequently originate
 from

from the misfortunes of others ; nor so *intense* or *durable* , and consequently their happiness is much inferior to that of persons engaged in speculative pursuits.

To ensure the continuance of the pleasures resulting from the exercise of the intellectual or other mental faculties, the concurrence of certain circumstances are necessary, or contribute much. 1st. *Health*, which indeed is the substraction of any sort of happiness, and consequently moderate *exercise*, as without it health cannot be long maintained. 2dly, *Patience*, and a placid temper, which is absolutely requisite in philosophic pursuits. 3dly, *Society* of persons engaged in the same pursuits, and a correspondence with the most eminent in our own or in foreign countries. 4thly, *Relaxation* from continued attention, either by pleasing conversation on other subjects or by theatrical amusements, or by entertaining *books*, during the perusal of which the mind is almost wholly passive, as accounts of voyages, travels, select novels, &c. Lastly, a prudent stated attention to the sources of competence.

A mind thus incessantly occupied bids fair for the enjoyment of as much happiness as can be found in the present state of our existence.

I should here conclude, did I not think it necessary to obviate some objections to different parts of the above essay.

First, it has been said, that the closest attention to a pleasure of our own chusing, is not a proof of the intensity
of

of that pleasure, for that gamblers pay the strictest attention to games in which they are deeply interested, and yet certainly feel no intense pleasure. This instance, however, does not meet my statement; for gaming, when not a relaxation, is not a pleasure, but a refuge from *ennui*, and the attention it exacts when success or loss is of great importance, is of the most perturbed and anxious kind, ever fluctuating betwixt hope and despair.

Secondly, that in general men love pleasure more than they fear pain, has been indirectly opposed by Barbeyrac,* but the truth of this assertion is evident from daily observation. Drunkards, epicures, and libertines pursue their practices though certain of inevitable pain. Barbeyrac, indeed, says no more than that men hate pain as much as they love pleasure, but properly speaking we do not *hate* pains we do not feel, we only *fear* them when we expose ourselves to them, and this fear is generally overcome by the love of pleasure.

Thirdly, according to Dr. Ferguson, the pleasure of a miser in hoarding money may be not only more entire than that of the prodigal in spending it, but as great as that of the virtuoso, the scholar, or the man of taste.† This

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sentiment

* Notes on Puffendorf, Lib. 1. c. 6. sect. 14.

† Essay on the History of Civil Society, part 1. sect. 8. p. 72, 73, Dublin Edit.

sentiment in so considerate a man as Dr. Ferguson, I own surprises me, even though he supposes the miser free from the passions of jealousy and envy. Could he suppose the pleasure of an Elwes, devoured by anxiety, and who deprived himself of the common gratifications of sense, as well as of all intellectual pleasures, and covered by the contempt of all who knew him, equal with the pleasures of a Newton, a Grotius, a Sydney, or an Addison? The pleasures of a miser are only those of a crazed imagination, as those of a Bedlamite who imagines himself an emperor.

Fourthly, according to the sagacious author of the light of nature,* “ all pleasures depend on our constitution and disposition. To instance only the acquisition of knowledge, which is commonly held sweet to the mind, by the very frame of her constitution. But if it were so, every accession of knowledge would engage every body alike, whereas in fact we find the contrary. What would the mathematician give to know the newest fashions as they start into vogue? or what cares the beau for discoveries in astronomy, or explanations of attraction or repulsion, and other secrets of nature?” Be it so; the question examined in this essay is, what pursuits are most productive of happiness, and surely he will not say that the pursuits of
a beau

* Vol. 2. part 2. chap. 22. p. 97,

a beau are as productive of happiness in the sense I take that word, as those of a mathematician blessed with a competent fortune. His original assertion may well be doubted, for when knowledge is fashionable, thousands will endeavour to attain it; the metaphysical lectures of *Abelard* allured 3000 young men into the deserts of Champagne, from Paris, Flanders, England and Germany; the mathematician D'Alembert, though possessed of a very moderate income, refused a much greater offered him by the empress of Russia, if he would attend her court. How many mathematicians and men excelling in every branch of science has France produced since science has been there honoured and encouraged? Numbers would equally be excited in other countries to the attainment of science, in circumstances equally favourable; consequently, fondness for science does not entirely depend on a particular frame of mind, though it must be owned that some minds are more eagerly prompted to its pursuit than others.

Lastly, it has been said by *Maupertuis* and others, that the *evils* of every condition far surpass its pleasures; in proof of which they say that few would consent to renew precisely the same course of life through which they had already passed. Yet I believe that *many* in the situations above mentioned, as most productive of happiness, and *many* in the middle classes of society would, with the ex-

ception of some immoralities, of which reason and religion forbid the repetition, gladly once more renew the same course of life. At least Virgil was of that opinion, for mentioning those whose sufferings induced them to terminate their lives, he says :

—— quam vellent æthere in alto
Nunc et pauperiem pati duosque labore

FINIS.

E R R A T A.

THE author requests the indulgence of the reader for this table of errata, which, undoubtedly, would not have swelled so considerably, had not his unavoidable absence in the country, during the impression of the work, materially interfered with the correction of the proofs, and necessitated him to confide the revision of the latter part to some resident friends, who had other difficulties besides those of an almost illegible hand and total ignorance of the subject, to struggle with in their exertions. The alterations, however, do not materially affect the sense, except in a very few instances, and the reader will, while he marks *those* in the margin, before he commences the perusal, kindly excuse the little inaccuracies of orthography or punctuation which may have been casually overlooked.

Page

- 18 line 5 from top, read "40" for 4
- 27 last line, for "which misled them" read "by which they were misled"
- 34 line 6 from bottom, put the sentence from "Apud" to "temple" in line 3 from bottom, both inclusive, in a parenthesis, or note
- 40 line 3 from bottom, dele "and"
- 57 line 8, for "rulers" read "ruler"
- 74 note, for "ἐϋνη" read "ἔτη"
- *82 line 3, remove first bracket of parenthesis to next line after "priest"
- 86 line 6 from bottom, for "with" read "in powerful" &c.
- 86 line 3 from bottom, for "to" read "from the feelings" &c.
- *93 line 8 from bottom, dele semicolon after "Heaven"
- 98 line 11, for "by" read "in"
- 112 line 5, dele semicolon after "principii" put comma
- 119 line 2, dele "into"
- *126 line 9, for "423 years" read "523"
- *127 line 3, after "683 years" add 7 months
- *127 line 14 read for 453 y. 7 months, 463. put comma between "633" and 7 months
- *129 line 4 from bottom, for 638" read "683"
- 129 line 11, for "263" read "363"
- *130 line 8 from top, for "Josephus" read "Joshua"
- *136 for "458" read "478"
- 138 put comma between 567 and 7 months, similarly in next line, 586, 7
- 138 last line but one of note, "Apion" for "Aponi"
- 138 last line, read "uncompromising"
- 156 line 3, for "Gibbi" read Gibli"
- 162 line 5 from bottom, read "editor" for "editors"
- 164 line 9, for "that" read "this"

- *168 line 2, dele " not"
- *169 line 5, for " 200" read " 800"
- * line 8, read " 807" for " 907"
- * note, "accurately" instead of "inaccurately" and "consistent" instead of "inconsistent"
- 171 line 5, dele semicolon after " millenary" put a comma
- 173 line 11, for "was" read " were"
- 173 line 5 from bottom, put a comma after " as"
- *175 line 9, after " 350" read years
- * after " any" read " one"
- 176 line 2, put a comma after " single" and after " event" a comma
- *177 line 3, before " from" read " the interval" for " to" read " until"
- *178 line 13, for " ascribed" read " stated"

§ Thus marked * are the more important, and should be corrected previous'y to perusal